By Bradley Jarka
Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender 

In People v. Daniels, 2017 IL App (1st) 142130-B, the First District of the Illinois Appellate Court has once again undertaken to define the limits of its own jurisdiction. This is the third decision of this kind to be featured on this blog this summer. For further discussion of this topic see Katherine Grosh’s recent analysis of People v. Griffin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143800 and Andrew Kwalwaser’s summary of People v. Grigorov, 2017 IL App (1st)143274.
 
In Daniels, the court held that it does not have jurisdiction to entertain the State’s request to reinstate charges previously dismissed pursuant to a nolle prosequi, where that request is made for the first time on appeal from the denial of a defendant’s 2-1401 petition. This deceptively simple holding is dependent on the surreptitious complexities lurking in the procedural posture of Daniels’s case, the substantive relief that Daniels requested, and the Illinois Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162. Each will be discussed in turn.
 

In 2005, Chicago police officers conducted a pat down search of Ronald Daniels on a city bus and found him to be in possession of an unloaded revolver and four rounds of ammunition. Based on that discovery, the State charged Daniels with several counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) and two counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Daniels pleaded guilty to the count of AUUW charged under Section 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(B) of the criminal code, which made it unlawful to possess an unloaded firearm outside his dwelling or place of business if ammunition was immediately accessible. Pursuant to that plea agreement, the State nolle prosequied (nolle’d) the remaining counts that Daniels had been charged with. Daniels did not take a direct appeal. Instead, once his sentence was completed in early 2014, Daniels filed a 2-1401 petition (735 ILCS 5/2-1401) seeking to vacate his conviction for AUUW. The circuit court denied his petition and Daniels appealed.

By the time Daniels’s case was up on appeal, his path to substantive relief had largely been forged. In 2013, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, which held that Section 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute was facially unconstitutional. Shortly thereafter, in People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, the court clarified that its holding extended to both the Class 4 and Class 2 “versions” of that offense. In Daniels’s case, the State conceded that Aguilar and Burns applied with equal force to Section (a)(1), (a)(3)(B) of the AUUW statute and agreed that Daniels’s conviction under that section should be vacated. Then, for the first time, the State asked the appellate court to remand so that it could reinstate the charges that it had nolle’d in exchange for Daniels’s plea. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the State’s request.

Enter Shinaul. Like Daniels, Cornelius Shinaul pleaded guilty to one count of AUUW and the State nolle’d the rest of the counts. Like Daniels, Shinaul filed a 2-1401 petition arguing that his conviction should be vacated in light of Aguilar. The State similarly agreed that Shinaul’s conviction had to be vacated. Then, while the case was still in the circuit court, the State filed a motion to reinstate the previously nolle’d charges. The circuit court denied the State’s motion and its subsequent motion to reconsider and the State appealed. Another division of the First District found that there was no jurisdiction to consider the State’s request. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed.

At issue in Shinaul was whether the appellate court has jurisdiction over the State’s appeal from the circuit court’s denial of its motion to reinstate charges after the court had vacated the defendant’s only count conviction. The court concluded that the appellate court did have jurisdiction. There were two key parts to the court’s holding. First, the court found that the State’s motion to reinstate the nolle’d charges was properly filed as the equivalent to a responsive pleading “conditioned upon [Shinaul]’s success in vacating his conviction.” Second, the court found that the denial of the State’s motion to reinstate was, in fact, part of the circuit court’s final judgment in the litigation of Shinaul’s 2-1401 petition. Final judgments are “determination[s] by the circuit court on the issues presented on the pleadings” that permanently affix the rights of the parties. This led the court to hold that, by properly filing its motion to reconsider in the circuit court, the State had made reinstatement of the nolle’d counts “pertinent to the outcome of the judgment” as one of the “issues before the circuit court.” The State thus had the right to appeal that judgment and the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider it.

So, what of Daniels? The State filed a petition for leave to appeal the appellate court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to consider reinstatement. The supreme court denied that petition but vacated the appellate court’s judgment and ordered the court to reconsider in light of Shinaul.

Upon reconsideration, the court in Daniels made quick work of distinguishing Shinaul. The court held that the State’s choice to raise the issue of reinstatement for the first time on appeal was a fatal distinction. The appellate court recognized that the circuit court had rendered a final judgment, but found that the judgment had been limited to the merits of Daniels’s 2-1401 petition and had not included any request by the State to reinstate charges. This, of course, was different than Shinaul where the circuit court’s judgment had included both the merits of Shinaul’s 2-1401 petition and the State’s responsive request to reinstate previously nolle’d charges.

For similar reasons, the court then considered and rejected the possibility of exercising original appellate jurisdiction, which is authorized by Article VI, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution, “when necessary to the complete determination of any case on review.” Here, the court adopted the reasoning from its original opinion and found that the only “case on review” was the merits disposition of Daniels’s 2-1401 petition. That case was a separate civil proceeding unrelated to the original criminal prosecution. Entertaining a request to reinstate charges that were part of the underlying criminal case was not necessary to the determination of the 2-1401 petition. Original jurisdiction was lacking as well.

Ultimately, the appellate court reaffirmed its original disposition of Daniels’s appeal. The court reversed the circuit court’s denial of Daniels’s 2-1401 petition, vacated his AUUW conviction, and declined to reach the State’s request to reinstate the nolle’d charges for lack of jurisdiction. In a footnote, the court suggested that the State was not without a remedy. Subject to statutory or constitutional limitations, the State could either file a new indictment or move, in the circuit court, for reinstatement of the nolle’d charges.

It is worth noting that the Rule 23 order in People v. Burris, 2017 IL App (1st) 142860-U, was reissued just last week on August 16th upon remand to reconsider its prior decision in light of Shinaul. Upon reconsideration, the court in Burris found that it indeed had jurisdiction to review the State’s request to reinstate nolle’d charges (it ultimately denied the State’s request on the merits). As in Shinaul, the State in Burris had made a motion to reinstate the charges in the circuit court prior to taking its appeal.

Justice Zenoff of the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, seeks a judicial law clerk for an opening in her chambers in Rockford. Applicants should have an excellent academic record, superior research and writing skills, and outstanding communication, computer, and organizational skills. Strongly prefer experience as a judicial law clerk or practitioner. Journal experience, especially Law Review, also preferred.

Applicant must be willing to live within 45 minutes of chambers and make a minimum 2 year commitment. Position available September 2017. To apply, submit cover letter, resume (with LSAT, GPA, class rank, and bar status), law school transcript, 2 writing samples, and 3 references to Carl Norberg at cnorberg@illinoiscourts.gov. This position is open until filled. EOE.

By Josh Wolff
Law Clerk to Hon. Eileen O'Neill Burke, Illinois Appellate Court, First District

The Netflix 10-episode documentary "Making a Murderer" detailed the story of Steven Avery, a Wisconsin man who had been wrongfully convicted of sexual assault and attempted murder. After serving 18 years in prison for the crimes, Avery was released in 2003. Two years later, however, Avery was arrested for allegedly murdering Therea Halbach. During the investigation, the police interviewed Avery's nephew, 16-year-old Brendan Dassey, who confessed to helping Avery commit the murder. 

Both Avery and Dassey were charged and eventually convicted of Halbach's murder. Dassey was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to review his case. 

In 2015, Dassey filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, seeking to be released from prison or a new trial. He alleged that various of his constitutional rights were violated, but in particular that his confession to the police had been coerced in violation of the fifth amendment. In 2016, a federal magistrate judge agreed, finding that his confession had been coerced. Accordingly, because his confession was unconstitutional, the judge ordered him to be released from prison.

The Wisconsin Justice Department appealed that decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which stayed Dassey's release pending the appeal. In June 2017, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge's decision in a 2-1 opinion, with Judge Hamilton dissenting. It further granted Dassey's writ of habeas corpus unless the State of Wisconsin elected to retry him within 90 days of the Seventh Circuit's final mandate. 

The Wisconsin Justice Department requested a rehearing en banc in front of the entire panel of the Seventh Circuit. The court grantedthe request and vacated its original decision. Now, on September 26, the full Seventh Circuit will hear Dassey's case. 

By Katherine A. Grosh
Partner, Levin Ginsburg

In People v. Griffin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143800, the First District Appellate Court declined to reach the merits of a case that the court characterized as “but one of hundreds of criminal appeals involving fines-and-fees issues that were overlooked at the trial court level and raised for the first time on appeal.” Id. ¶ 5. In the case, the defendant pled guilty to two crimes in two separate cases and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms in both cases, with fines and fees. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. The defendant did not file either a motion to withdraw his plea or to reconsider his sentence, nor did he file a direct appeal in either case. Id. ¶ 2.

More than 30 days after sentencing in both cases, the defendant filed a pro se motion to correct the mittimus to reflect a different custody date for purposes of calculating presentence detention credit, which the trial court denied. Id. ¶ 1. He appealed the denial of his motion, abandoning his initial claim as to the custody date, and instead contending for the first time that his fines and fees were erroneously assessed against him and that he was entitled to presentencing detention credit. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4.

The appellate court found that, because the defendant failed to file a motion pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment or a motion to reconsider his sentence within 30 days of his sentencing, it could not consider his appeal on the merits. Id. ¶¶ 1, 11. The appellate court further found that the denial of his motion to correct the mittimus was not a final and appealable order over which it had jurisdiction because—unlike the sentencing orders—it did not determine the litigation on the merits. Id. ¶¶ 1, 13. Accordingly, the appellate court dismissed the appeal. Id. ¶¶ 1, 27.

The most noteworthy aspect of the opinion was the appellate court’s express recognition that the raising of fines-and-fees issues for the first time on appeal has become a “routine” issue in criminal appeals—one that “could easily be discovered and resolved at the trial court level with more diligent oversight by prosecutors and defense attorneys alike.” Id. ¶¶ 5-6. According to the court’s own Westlaw search, in 2016 alone, there were 137 appeals where a defendant challenged the imposition of fines and/or fees, and 83 cases in which a defendant asserted error in the application of per diem credit against his fines, “all for the first time on appeal.” Id. ¶ 5.

The court stated that “[t]he time has come to take a more serious look at this problem, both for the sake of preserving proper appellate jurisprudence and for the sake of judicial economy.” Id. ¶ 7. The court continued: “Copious amounts of time, effort, and ink are spent resolving these issues at the appellate level when many of them are more appropriately resolved at the trial level through (i) routine review of judgment orders after their entry—a task that would take at most minutes—and (ii) cooperation between the parties to correct any later-discovered errors by means of agreed orders.” Id. (citations omitted). The court “encourage[d] both the State’s Attorney and the public defender to review judgment orders upon entry to ensure that fines and fees are properly assessed,” and “further encourage[d] an open line of communication between the public defender’s office and the State’s Attorney’s office, so that when defense counsel discovers an obvious clerical error in the imposition of fines and fees, he or she can contact the State’s Attorney, and the error can be corrected expeditiously at the trial court level by means of an agreed order.” Id.

The court then went on to support its well-reasoned and amply supported determination of no jurisdiction with a historical discussion of the void judgment rule, abolished by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, followed by a rejection of the plain error doctrine as a vehicle for appellate review due to its inapplicability to clerical mistakes. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. The court then outlined what it termed a “three-step analysis,” followed immediately by its determination that it need not proceed beyond step two because the defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of the motion to correct the mittimus was not properly before the court due to the defendant’s failure to file the Rule 604(d) motion—“a condition precedent to any appeal from a judgment on a plea of guilty.” Id.¶¶ 10-11 (quoting People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 300-01 (2003)).

After reciting the well-established rule that “a trial court retains jurisdiction to correct clerical errors or matters of form at any time after judgment [such as the inadvertent use of the wrong custody date, as Griffin claimed occurred in this case], so as to make the record conform to the actual judgment entered by the court” notwithstanding a lack of compliance with Rule 604(d), the appellate court clarified that “[t]hat jurisdiction, though, does not automatically extend to this court.”  Id. ¶ 12.  Stating, “it is axiomatic that not every denial of a motion gives rise to a right of appeal,” the court explained that the denial of the motion to correct the mittimus was not a final and appealable order because “there no longer was any pending litigation to resolve when that motion was filed” and the trial court merely affirmed the correctness of an existing judgment. Id. ¶¶ 13-15. The court also summarily rejected any application of the revestment doctrine, since: (i) a Rule 604(d) motion was never filed (id. ¶ 20, citing People v. Henderson, 395 Ill.App.3d 980 (2009)), and (ii) parties may not “revest” a reviewing court with jurisdiction over issues that were never raised in the trial court (id. ¶¶ 21-22).

Although it dismissed the defendant’s appeal, the appellate court noted that he was not left without recourse, noting that he could still petition the trial court for the relief that he seeks because “trial courts retain jurisdiction to correct nonsubstantial matters of inadvertence or mistake.” Id. ¶ 26. 

At a recent ceremony at the David S. Palmer Arena, Illinois Supreme Court Justice Garman was honored by having the county courthouse named in her honor—it will now be known as the Rita B. Garman Vermilion County Courthouse.

The Commercial-News reports the story.

At the ceremony, Justice Garman noted that early in her career opportunities “for a young woman lawyer were limited[.]” But she gained experience in both government and private practice. And eventually she became an associate judge, then an a circuit judge, then the presiding judge for Vermilion County. She was appointed to the Supreme Court in 2001 and served as the chief judge from 2013 to 2016. The Commercial-News reports that Justice Garman was the first chief justice to serve in every capacity in the state judiciary, and the first woman to hold each of those positions.

The article also reports that over 200 people, including local and state officials, attended the ceremony. Keynote speaker and former Illinois Governor Jim Edgar stated that 40 years ago, he never thought that the Vermilion County courthouse would be named for a judge who was a woman, but that, “How times have changed—and I must say, for the better.” Chief Justice Lloyd Karmeier—Justice Garman’s successor as chief justice—commended the Vermilion County Board and community for having the foresight to honor Justice Garman.

Justice Garman noted that that the ceremony and honor “have made me acutely aware that I am not an island. I am a piece of this community, just as every member of this audience is a piece of a larger whole.”

At a recent ceremony at the David S. Palmer Arena, Illinois Supreme Court Justice Garman was honored by having the county courthouse named in her honor—it will now be known as the Rita B. Garman Vermilion County Courthouse.

The Commercial-News reports the story.

At the ceremony, Justice Garman noted that early in her career opportunities “for a young woman lawyer were limited[.]” But she gained experience in both government and private practice. And eventually she became an associate judge, then an a circuit judge, then the presiding judge for Vermilion County. She was appointed to the Supreme Court in 2001 and served as the chief judge from 2013 to 2016. The Commercial-News reports that Justice Garman was the first chief justice to serve in every capacity in the state judiciary, and the first woman to hold each of those positions.

The article also reports that over 200 people, including local and state officials, attended the ceremony. Keynote speaker and former Illinois Governor Jim Edgar stated that 40 years ago, he never thought that the Vermilion County courthouse would be named for a judge who was a woman, but that, “How times have changed—and I must say, for the better.” Chief Justice Lloyd Karmeier—Justice Garman’s successor as chief justice—commended the Vermilion County Board and community for having the foresight to honor Justice Garman.

Justice Garman noted that that the ceremony and honor “have made me acutely aware that I am not an island. I am a piece of this community, just as every member of this audience is a piece of a larger whole.”

By Louis J. Manetti
Attorney, Codilis and Associates, PC

Chief Judge Wood recently issued a call to comply with a rule that requires parties to summarize jurisdiction. In Baez-Sanchez v. Sessions, Nos. 16-3784 and 17-1438, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12306, at *1 (7th Cir. July 10, 2017), Chief Judge Wood released an opinion in two consolidated cases. Id. The chief judge expounds why the jurisdictional summary rule is important to the Court, explicitly reviews the rule’s requirements, and criticizes the widespread failure to follow all aspects of the rule. She states, “I am issuing this opinion in the hope that attorneys practicing in the Seventh Circuit, as well as our pro selitigants, will take heed and avoid these errors in the future.” Id. at *2.

The opinion explains that the Seventh Circuit screens all of its appeals to make sure that there are no jurisdictional problems—either in the district court or on appeal. Id. at *1-2. To screen cases, the Court relies on jurisdictional information that the parties supply. Id. at *2. The Court must have full and accurate jurisdictional statements because “for centuries it has been recognized that federal courts have an obligation—to assure themselves of their own jurisdiction.” Id. at *8 (quoting Kelly v. U.S., 29 F.3d 1107, 1113 (7th Cir. 1994)). Cases like Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign Market Place, LLC, 350 F.3d 691, 693 (7th Cir. 2003) stress how seriously the Court takes jurisdiction. There, the appellee suggested that the Seventh Circuit should simply rule on the appeal’s merits—even though it was discovered that diversity jurisdiction was lacking—because it would establish finality, and surely the court had ruled despite jurisdiction in the past. Id. The Court emphasized that this statement “leaves us agog . . . . [t]he proposition that the Seventh Circuit has [ruled without jurisdiction] in the past—a proposition unsupported by any citation—accuses the court of dereliction combined with usurpation.” Id. The jurisdictional summary acts as a bulwark against these threats.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28, and its corresponding circuit rule unique to the Seventh Circuit, mandate what must be in a jurisdictional statement. Baez-Sanchez, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12306, at *3. The appellant or petitioner must establish four things. First, appellants must show the basis for the district court’s jurisdiction. Id. at *3. This includes identifying the specific statute if federal question jurisdiction is involved, and showing the jurisdictional amount and citizenship—not residence—of each party if the case concerns diversity jurisdiction. Id. at *3-4. The opinion cautions that to articulate citizenship for an organization the litigant must work back through the ownership structure until either an individual human being or a formal corporation is identified. Id. at *7. Second, the jurisdictional statement must demonstrate the appellate court’s jurisdiction. Id. at *3. Third, it must articulate the dates showing that the appeal is timely—including the specific dates to show the judgment, any postjudgment motions and when they were resolved, and when the notice of appeal was filed. Id. at *3-4. Last, the statement must provide facts establishing the judgment’s finality or an exception to the final-judgment rule. Id. at *3.

The opinion then turns to appellees, who have their own “equally important” obligations under the rule. Id. at *6. The appellee must explicitly state whether the appellant’s jurisdictional summary is complete and correct. Id. Chief Judge Wood points out that “complete” and “correct” are not synonyms, and the appellee must verify that the appellant’s statement is both. Id. at *7. If it is not, the appellee must provide a complete jurisdictional summary. Id. at *6.

The opinion notes that “a distressing number of briefs filed in this court do not comply with the requirements” for jurisdictional statements. Id. at *2; see also The Practitioner’s Handbook for Appeals, at 134, located at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/forms/Handbook.pdf (reporting that the clerk’s office rejects about 10-15% of all submitted briefs because of rule violations). The appellees’ briefs submitted to the chief judge in the two consolidated cases illustrated this problem. In one case, the Attorney General of the United States’s brief reported that the petitioner’s “jurisdictional statement is correct.” Id. at *8-9. The statement was inadequate because it did not say anything about completeness. Id. at *9. The brief in the second case made “the mirror-image problem.” Id. That is, it declared that the appellant’s statement provided “a complete jurisdictional summary”—saying nothing about its correctness. Id. Hence, the Court struck both briefs and ordered the parties to file complying briefs within seven days. Id. at *10.

The chief judge’s frustration with the widespread failure to follow Appellate Procedure Rule 28 and its corresponding circuit rule was palpable. “There is no reason why, month after month, year after year, the court should encounter jurisdictional statements with such obvious flaws.” Id. at *9. For guidance, the opinion directs litigants to a jurisdictional checklist that the Court provides, http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/forms/check.pdf, and the recently updated Practitioner’s Handbook for Appeals, http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/forms/Handbook.pdf. Id. at *8. In closing, Chief Judge Wood expresses her hope that the opinion “will prevent the same problems from continuing to arise.” Baez-Sanchez, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12306, at *10.

The Chicago Bar Association recently started a new initiative to help communities in Chicago suffering from pervasive gun violence. On November 3, 2017, from 9 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., the CBA will host “A Call To Action: Communities Suffering From Gun Violence Meet Lawyers Offering Help.”
 
At the meeting, 20 community representatives from various Chicago neighborhoods will meet with lawyers, seeking legal assistance in four specific areas: (1) mental health services; (2) police/community relationships; (3) faith-based community services; and (4) jobs for high-risk men and women.
 
During the meeting, community representatives will speak about the four areas of need. The lawyers in attendance will then have an opportunity to speak to these representatives to better understand their needs and determine how they can help meet those needs.
 
Planning meetings about the initiative will take place on Wednesday, August 23 and 30 at 12:00 p.m. at the Chicago Bar Association building.
 
If you are interested in volunteering your services, please e-mail Terry Murphy (tmurphy@chicagobar.org) and let him know the area you would like to volunteer with.

By Andrew Kwalwaser 
Law Clerk to Hon. Thomas E. Hoffman, Illinois Appellate Court, First District

In People v. Grigorov, 2017 IL App (1st) 143274, a panel of the First District of the Illinois Appellate Court granted a defendant's request for presentencing detention credit but found that it lacked jurisdiction over other claims that he raised for the first time on appeal.
 
In April 2014, the defendant, George Grigorov, pleaded guilty to aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol and driving on a revoked or suspended license. The circuit court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of six and three years, respectively, with "all mandatory fines, fees, and court costs." He did not file a Rule 604(d) motion to reconsider his sentence or withdraw his plea, nor did he file a timely notice of appeal. In August 2014, however, he filed a petition pursuant to section 5-9-2 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-2 (West 2014)), requesting that the circuit court vacate $6,000 in imposed "assessments" due to his inability to pay. In September 2014, the circuit court denied the petition.
 
On appeal, the defendant abandoned his claim that his fines should be revoked due to his inability to pay and argued, for the first time, that (1) he should receive $975 in presentencing detention credit against his fines pursuant to section 110-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2012)), and (2) certain fines and fees were erroneously assessed.

As to his first claim of error, the appellate court granted the defendant presentencing detention credit. The court observed that, although the defendant's claims on appeal were "entirely new and unrelated" to his section 5-9-2 petition, section 110-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 allows the award of presentencing credit "merely 'upon application of the defendant.' " 725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2012). As the supreme court explained in People v. Caballero, 228 Ill. 2d 79, 88 (2008), a defendant can apply for credit "at any time and at any stage of court proceedings, even on appeal in a postconviction proceeding." Based upon this language, the court found that the interests of justice permitted the defendant to raise his claim for presentencing detention credit for the first time on appeal from the denial of his section 5-9-2 petition.
 
As to the defendant's contention that certain fines and fees were erroneously assessed, the court declined to reach the merits of his argument for several reasons. First, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction over his claims because they were not raised in the trial court and, moreover, section 5-9-2 of the Unified Code of Corrections "only deals with fines, not fees." Second, the court observed that the defendant did not file a Rule 604(d) motion, a necessary step for attacking fines and fees on appeal. Third, the court held that, in light of the abolition of the void judgment rule in People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, unauthorized fees are not void. In so holding, the court followed a line of decisions reaching the same conclusion and rejected the defendant's reliance on the only opinion that has held otherwise, People v. McCray, 2016 IL App (3d) 140554.

Fourth, the court found that the plain-error rule did not apply because the fees imposed against the defendant were not defects that affected his substantial rights, but rather were mathematical mistakes that did not implicate his right to a fair sentencing hearing. Finally, the court noted that judicial economy did not favor considering the defendant's arguments on the merits because "notions of judicial economy, by themselves, cannot create jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist." The court observed that judicial economy is best served when fines and fees are resolved at the circuit court level, particularly in situations like the case at bar, where the defendant is indigent and the possibility of collecting against him does not justify the resources expended in litigating the matter on appeal. 

On Monday, September 11, United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg will speak at the Auditorium Theatre in Chicago with United States Court of Appeals Judge Ann Claire Williams.

Justice Ginsburg, who has served on the Supreme Court since 1993, will discuss her life and judicial career. Judge Williams has served on the Seventh Circuit since 1999 and recently assumed senior status.

Individual tickets go on sale on July 28 at 10 a.m. and are $35 for the general public.

Please visit here for more information.