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"The Brief" - The ALA Blog

  • December 19, 2016 12:45 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    By Stephen Soltanzadeh
    Associate, Ancel Glink

    The First District of the Illinois Appellate Court recently held that it lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from a circuit court’s “supplemental opinion,” entered nearly a year after its initial decision, where the appellant did not timely file a notice of appeal from the initial order. The appellate court held that because the circuit court’s initial decision disposed of all claims between the parties, that decision was a final order; therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter a supplemental decision more than 30 days after the final order and, in turn, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the supplemental opinion.

    CitiBank N.A. v. The Illinois Department of Revenue, 2016 IL App (1st) 133650, involved a consolidated appeal concerning Department of Revenue denials of requests by plaintiffs CitiBank N.A. and Chrysler Financial Services America (Chrysler) for refunds of Retailers’ Occupation Tax Act (ROTA) taxes. Chrysler sought administrative review of the Department’s decision and, on March 14, 2014, the circuit court affirmed. Over eight months later, in November 2014, Chrysler filed a section 2-1401 petition (735 ILCS 5/2-1401) stating that it had not learned of the circuit court’s decision until October 2014 and arguing that the circuit court had overlooked a factual stipulation.

    In December 2014, the circuit court granted Chrysler’s section 2-1401 petition, and in March 2015, it issued a supplemental opinion, which again affirmed the Department’s decision. The March 2015 supplemental opinion was identical to the March 2014 decision, except that it contained an additional discussion of Chrysler’s argument regarding the stipulation and included a statement that Chrysler’s time for filing a notice of appeal would begin to run upon entry of the supplemental opinion. Chrysler filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the March 2015 supplemental opinion.

    The appellate court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because Chrysler failed to timely file a notice of appeal after the circuit court’s March 2014 order. The court explained that, because the March 2014 order disposed of all of Chrysler’s claims, it was final and left Chrysler with four choices: (1) file a posttrial motion within 30 days; (2) file a notice of appeal within 30 days; (3) accept the decision; or (4) file a section 2-1401 petition. Because Chrysler failed to timely file a notice of appeal from either the March 2014 final order or the December 2015 order granting the 2-1401 petition, it lost its opportunity to appeal.

    The court further rejected Chrysler’s argument that it was appealing only the court’s March 2015 modified opinion, not the March 2014 or December 2015 decisions. The court held that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to modify its decision after 30 days of its entry, and that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review an order that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to enter. The court also determined that the circuit court’s statement that Chrysler’s time to appeal would begin to run from entry of the March 2015 order had no effect because the circuit court may not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. Finally, the court observed that all of the claims raised by Chrysler on appeal related to issues decided in the circuit court’s March 2014 order, which Chrysler could appeal only by timely filing a timely notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of the order. Accordingly, the court dismissed Chrysler’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

  • December 13, 2016 3:16 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    By Paul Berks
    Massey & Gail LLP

    In United States v. Worthen, No. 15-3521, the Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal of a criminal conviction on the grounds that the defendant waived his right to appeal as a condition of entering a plea agreement.

    A grand jury indicted defendant Worthen on four counts, including “causing death while using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence,” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), which carried a potential sentence of death or life in prison. Worthen pled guilty to the section 924(j) charge, as well as a robbery charge, and agreed to waive his appeal rights. In exchange, the government dismissed the other counts and promised not to seek the death penalty.

    The district court subsequently sentenced Worthen to 60 years in prison – 10 years for robbery and 50 years for the section 924(j) charge. Worthen appealed, arguing that robbery was not a “crime of violence” within the meaning of the statute, and therefore was not a predicate offense necessary to support his conviction. Absent a conviction on a valid predicate offense, Worthen argued his section 924(j) conviction was invalid.

    The government moved to dismiss the appeal because Worthen had waived his right to appeal as part of his plea deal. The Seventh Circuit noted that it had long enforced the general rule that “appeal waivers are enforceable and preclude appellate review.” The court also recognized that it had previously carved out a “narrow exception[ ] to this rule” when “a sentence *** exceeds the statutory maximum for the crime committed.” Worthen argued he fell within this exception because, if his conviction under section 924(j) was invalid, the maximum sentence on the remaining robbery charge was 20 years, and his 60-year sentence would therefore exceed the statutory maximum for the crime for which he was convicted.

    The Seventh Circuit rejected this reasoning as “entirely circular” because it would require the court to determine the merits of his appeal in order to assess the validity of his appellate waiver. The court explained that, under Worthen’s approach, “the rule would be that an appeal wavier is enforceable unless the appellant would succeed on the merits of his appeal.” It explained that this approach would effectively “eviscerate the right to waive an appeal” by merging the merits of the appeal with the validity of the waiver.

    The court further recognized that the effective reversal of its “longstanding precedent that appeal waivers are generally enforceable” would reduce the willingness of the government to offer appeal waivers as part of plea deals. This, in turn, would lead the government to offer less generous plea bargain terms, harming defendants, like Worthen, who secured a promise from the government not to seek the death penalty, in part, in exchange for his waiver of the right to appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed Worthen’s appeal without considering its merits.

  • December 05, 2016 12:04 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    By Karen Kies DeGrand
    Partner, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC

    On November 29, 2016, the ALA convened for lunch at the Union League Club in Chicago, and ALA members and guests were treated to a lively presentation concerning ethical problems facing appellate lawyers. The discussion also encompassed the broader topic of trends in legal ethics.

    These two distinguished attorneys stand at the forefront of legal ethics in Illinois. Ms. Foster teaches several legal ethics courses at Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, where she covers not only the general topic but also lectures on legal ethics for the business lawyer, legal ethics for the global lawyer and legal ethics for the public interest/government lawyer. Drawing on her many years of experience as a Senior Trial Lawyer for the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois (“ARDC”) and as counsel for the ARDC Review Board, Ms. Foster has taught numerous legal ethics courses and programs for other law schools and continuing legal education providers. Mr. Grogan, Deputy Administrator and the Chief Counsel of the ARDC, has served the state for more than 36 years investigating and prosecuting charges of lawyer misconduct and has argued dozens of disciplinary cases in the Supreme Court of Illinois. An adjunct professor at the Loyola University School of Law, Mr. Grogan has taught legal ethics and lectured on various professional responsibility topics in a variety of settings.

    Acknowledging that appellate lawyers generally are not prone to ARDC-prosecuted violations, the speakers identified the most common areas of disciplinary concern. Most frequently, neglect or incompetence, either as a pattern in in conjunction with other misconduct, will draw the ARDC’s attention to the appellate practitioner. Ms. Foster described an extreme situation that arose in the context of a Seventh Circuit appeal, where an attorney’s lies about illness to avoid oral argument plus other misconduct resulted in a 60-day suspension and restitution of a fee. The speakers also discussed Illinois rule changes, which include requiring additional disclosure by Illinois lawyers with no malpractice insurance and inquiry into attorneys’ succession plans for their practices.

    The speakers also addressed nationwide trends. One new rule under discussion is ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), adopted in August, 2016, which categorizes conduct that constitutes harassment or discrimination as professional misconduct. Also drawing widespread disciplinary attention is lawyer misuse of social medical, including Facebook misconduct, and unprofessional behavior in the employment arena.

    The ALA extends sincere thanks to Jim Grogan and Mary Foster for their humorous and informative presentation.

  • November 28, 2016 12:27 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    By Andrew Kwalwaser 
    Law Clerk to Hon. Thomas E. Hoffman, Illinois Appellate Court, First District


    In Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 Board ofEducation, et al. v. Whitaker, No. 16-8019, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that it lost jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal when the District Court of the Eastern District of Wisconsin revoked its certification of the appeal.


    The plaintiff, a transgender boy, sued his school district for sex discrimination after his high school prohibited him from using the boys' bathroom. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court denied. Following a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the defendants submitted a proposed order certifying for appeal the order that denied their motion to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district court entered the proposed order, and the defendants filed the instant petition for interlocutory appeal. Additionally, the defendants filed a separate appeal from the district court's order partially granting the preliminary injunction.


    While the instant appeal was pending, the plaintiff moved the district court to reconsider certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The district court granted the plaintiff's motion and revoked certification, finding that the defendants "had not made a legal or factual argument in support of certification" and that the district court had erred by not soliciting argument on the issue. The district court also stated that it erred by omitting "interlocutory certification language" from the certification order.


    The district court observed that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) sets forth several factors to be considered in certifying an interlocutory appeal, including whether the underlying order involves a "controlling question of law," "whether an immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation," and "whether there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion on the question of law." Although determination of whether sex "encompasses gender identity" for purposes of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, would control one of the plaintiff's claims, the district court found that it would not advance the litigation because the plaintiff had pleaded facts sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss on other grounds.


    The Seventh Circuit asked the parties to file statements of position regarding the district court's revocation of certification. Both parties agreed, as did the Seventh Circuit, that its jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal under U.S.C. § 1292(b) "derives from a district court's certification of an order." As the Seventh Circuit had not entered an order granting the petition at the time the district court withdrew certification, the Seventh Circuit lost jurisdiction to consider the instant appeal.


    The defendants argued that the Seventh Circuit could exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction in connection to the separate appeal from the preliminary injunction order. The Seventh Circuit observed that the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction allows a reviewing court to consider a non-final order that is "inextricably intertwined" with an appealable order. As the instant appeal was not properly taken from an appealable order, pendent appellate jurisdiction did not exist. Instead, the Seventh Circuit noted that "[t]he appropriate place for the defendants to request pendent appellate jurisdiction is in the appeal from the preliminary injunction order." Consequently, the Seventh Circuit denied the defendants' petition for interlocutory appeal.


  • November 18, 2016 8:21 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    Cases Pending, edited by Hon. Clare J. Quish (pictured left) and Gretchen Sperry, has been updated to discuss the Illinois Supreme Court’s November Term, which began Monday, November 14, 2016, with oral arguments scheduled for November 15, 2016. A total of 4 cases were heard – 1 civil and 3 criminal. Here is the civil case with the date of oral argument:

    Board of Education of Springfield School District No. 186 v. The Attorney General of Illinois—No. 120343—November 15

    Below is an abbreviated summary for the case. Summaries for this case and others pending with the Supreme Court can be found in our Cases Pending publication, accessible to ALA members on our website.

    No. 120343
    Board of Educ. of Springfield School Dist. No. 186 v. Attorney General of Illinois

    The following two issues are presented in this appeal: (1) whether the signing of an agreement during a closed session meeting constitutes a final action in violation of section 2(e) of the Open Meetings Act (“Act”) where the agreement was later approved by vote at a subsequent public meeting; and (2) whether the public was adequately informed of the nature of the public action to be taken at the subsequent meeting.

    Plaintiff, the Board of Education of Springfield School District No. 186 (“Board”), terminated its superintendent’s employment contract upon mutual agreement. The superintendent signed the agreement on January 31, 2013, and at a closed session meeting on February 4, 2013, a majority of the Board signed, but did not date, the agreement. The agenda for the March 5, 2013 Board meeting included an action item to approve a resolution related to the agreement and included a copy of the agreement itself. At the next Board meeting, the Board approved the agreement in open session and added the March 5, 2013 date to the Board members’ signatures on the agreement.

    The Illinois Attorney General (“AG”) issued a binding opinion concluding that the signing of the agreement during the February 4, 2013, closed session meeting constituted a “final action” in violation of section 2(e) of the Act (5 ILCS 120/2(e)). On the Board’s complaint for administrative review, the circuit court found that the “final action” occurred on March 5, 2013, when the Board members voted to approve the agreement during the public meeting.

    The AG then issued a second binding opinion, concluding that the Board violated the Act by failing to adequately inform the public of the nature of the public business being conducted at the March 5, 2013, meeting. The circuit court again reversed, finding that the AG expanded the requirements of the Act to require that a public body explain the significance of the final action to be taken, rather than merely advise the public of the nature of the final action to be taken.

    The Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District affirmed both circuit court orders. Relying on Grissom v. Board of Education, 75 Ill. 2d 314 (1979), it held that a Board can discuss and vote on an employment decision in closed session and hold a final roll call vote on that decision in open session without violating the Act. The appellate court also concluded that the Act only requires that the public agency advise the public about the general nature of the final action to be taken, but it is not required to provide a detailed explanation as to the significance or impact of the final action.

    In her petition for leave to appeal, the AG argues that the appellate court’s decision allows public bodies to take final action during open meetings without making a public recital at the meeting to inform the public about the business being transacted, in violation of section 2(e) of the Act. The AG also argues that the appellate court erred in holding that the Board validly approved the separation agreement at the March 5, 2013, meeting because the public was not adequately informed about the general subject matter of the agreement, which is inconsistent with the language of section 2(e) of the Act and with the Act's purpose of keeping the public “informed as to the conduct of their business.” 5 ILCS 120/1.

  • November 16, 2016 12:26 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    By Richard Harris
    Law Clerk to Hon. Susan F. Hutchinson, Illinois Appellate Court, Second District

    In McDonald v. Adamson, No, 15-1305, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed a ruling from the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that an inmate’s claims were barred by res judicata.
     
    In 2010, Illinois state prison inmate Donald McDonald filed a complaint in the Illinois Court of Claims against the Illinois Department of Corrections. McDonald claimed that he had been denied his First Amendment free exercise rights as a practicing Muslim. He alleged that he was not permitted to attend Friday prayer services, that prison officials regularly stole prayer cassette tapes and prayer rugs, and that Christians were allowed to have more volunteers enter the prison than were Muslims. McDonald sought, among other things, a damages award of $5,000.
     
    The Illinois Court of Claims conducted a hearing on McDonald’s complaint but failed to issue a decision for more than two years. In the interim, McDonald filed a similar complaint in the federal district court seeking injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 2013, the Illinois Court of Claims issued an order rejecting the allegations in McDonald’s original complaint. The district court subsequently dismissed McDonald’s federal complaint, finding that the order from the Illinois Court of Claims rendered the federal complaint barred by res judicata.

    On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the defendants’ concession that McDonald’s federal claim was not barred by res judicata. The court explained that Illinois law affords preclusive effect only to a final judgment rendered by a “court of competent jurisdiction.” Because the Illinois Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to consider claims based upon a federal statute or the federal or state constitutions, it is not a “court of competent jurisdiction” under Illinois preclusion law. Thus, the adverse judgment in the Illinois Court of Claims did not bar McDonald’s federal complaint based upon the same facts.

    The Seventh Circuit also declined to address the defendants’ collateral estoppel argument. The court acknowledged that res judicata and collateral estoppel are separate legal doctrines, but noted that the defendants bore the burden to raise collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense in the district court. Hence, the Seventh Circuit would not affirm a judgment based on an affirmative defense raised for the first time on appeal.

    The Seventh Circuit noted in closing that, on remand, the district court would be free to grant McDonald leave to amend his complaint. The defendants would also have an opportunity to renew their motion to dismiss. 

  • November 11, 2016 6:23 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    By Josh Wolff
    Research Attorney, Illinois Appellate Court, First District

    On November 29, 2016, the ALA will host a luncheon focusing on ethics for appellate practitioners featuring Jim Grogan, Deputy Administrator and Chief Counsel of the Illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission and Mary Foster, former Review Board counsel at the ARDC and current senior lecturer at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law.

    At the luncheon, Grogan and Foster will discuss ethical issues that uniquely affect appellate attorneys. The program will be held at the Union League Club in Chicago and run from noon t0 1:30 p.m. Attendees will receive one hour of MCLE ethics credit.

    For more information and to register for either event, please click here.

  • November 07, 2016 3:21 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)
    By Josh Wolff
    Research Attorney, Illinois Appellate Court, First District

    The Association’s April 2017 luncheon will feature Erwin Chemerinsky, the renowned legal scholar and dean of the University of California, Irvine School of Law. Chemerinsky recently wrote an article for the ABA Journal discussing how the United State’s Supreme Court’s lack of a ninth justice has affected its docket.

     

    Chemerinsky observed that, at the end of the Court’s first month, its docket only had 39 cases, which was “significantly fewer than usual for this point of the term.” In addition to the smaller docket, Chemerinsky noted that the effect of only eight justices could be seen by looking at the Court’s December schedule for oral argument. “Four of the six days that the court is hearing arguments, the justices will hear only one case, rather than the two, or occasionally three, cases usually heard per day.”

     

    Chemerinsky also believed that the Court is waiting for the appointment of a ninth justice for some cases that were granted review last January and have already been fully briefed, but remain without a date for oral argument. Those cases include: Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia,Missouri v. Pauley, which “concerns whether it violates free exercise of religion or denies equal protection for a state to give aid (the material for the bottom of playgrounds) to public and secular private schools, but not to religious schools”; Wisconsin v. Murr, which concerns “the takings clause and how it is determined whether adjacent pieces of property should be deemed to be one or two pieces of property”; and Microsoft v. Baker, which concerns “whether plaintiffs can appeal the denial of class certification by dismissing their suit.”

     

    The full article can be accessed here.


  • October 25, 2016 11:22 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    By John M. Fitzgerald (left), Partner, Tabet DiVito & Rothstein LLC 
    Garrett L. Boehm, Jr., Shareholder, Johnson & Bell, Ltd.

    Effective November 1, 2016, the Illinois Supreme Court has made significant amendments to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307, which governs interlocutory appeals from, among other things, orders granting or denying motions for injunctive relief. These amendments were successfully proposed by the ALA in the hope that they would promote fairness, efficiency and clarity in Rule 307 interlocutory appeals.

    Rule 307 was amended in two primary ways.

    First, the amendments provide that parties to Rule 307(a) appeals no longer need to file a full record on appeal. They may instead file a Rule 328 supporting record, which is compiled by the appellant (not the circuit court clerk) and supported by affidavit. The appellee may file a supplemental supporting record if he or she feels that the appellant’s supporting record was incomplete. The process of compiling a Rule 328 supporting record can be much quicker and easier than compiling a full record on appeal, and this more expeditious manner of presenting a pertinent record to the reviewing court can be essential in a Rule 307 interlocutory appeal, in which at least one party normally claims the existence of an emergency. (Pursuant to the amendment, full records on appeal are still required in cases arising under the Juvenile Court Act where an order terminating parental rights has been entered.)

    Second, the amendments effectively overrule the Illinois Appellate Court’s opinion in Nizamuddin v. Community Education in Excellence, Inc., 2013 IL App (2d) 131230. Nizamuddin held that, in Rule 307(d) appeals — which are appeals from orders granting or denying motions for temporary restraining orders (TROs) — the notice of appeal must be filed in the appellate court (not the circuit court) even though “the rule does not state point-blank” that the notice must be filed in the appellate court. See Nizamuddin, 2013 IL App (2d) 131230, ¶ 6. The Supreme Court’s amendment now specifies that the notice of appeal in a Rule 307(d) interlocutory appeal — as in all other types of appeals — shall be filed “in the circuit court.”

    Nizamuddin also held that parties may not file documents via mail or delivery to a third-party commercial carrier in Rule 307(d) appeals, notwithstanding that Rule 373 expressly authorizes that method of filing papers in a reviewing court and there is nothing in Rule 307 to the contrary. See Nizamuddin, 2013 IL App (2d) 131230, ¶¶ 7-11. The Supreme Court has amended Rule 307 to provide that Rule 373 may be utilized in Rule 307(d) appeals, provided that the relevant documents are sent by overnight delivery.

    Conclusion

    The ALA remains active in proposing amendments to the Illinois Supreme Court Rules that are intended to promote fairness, efficiency and clarity in the appellate process. The ALA appreciates the Illinois Supreme Court’s adoption of the amendments proposed by the ALA. Any ALA members who have ideas for amending the Illinois Supreme Court Rules are encouraged to contact the co-chairs of the ALA Rules Committee, John Fitzgerald and Garrett Boehm. 

  • October 19, 2016 5:30 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    By Louis J. Manetti

    Attorney, Codilis and Associates, PC

    The Seventh Circuit recently broadened a prior holding and stated that, under a federal standard of finality, foreclosure judgments are not final and appealable orders. In Bank of America, N.A. v. Martinson, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12402, *1, the bank filed a foreclosure action in Wisconsin, and the borrowers removed the case to federal court. The federal district court entered judgment in the bank’s favor, and the order provided for a sheriff’s sale after the borrowers’ time to redeem the property expired. Id. The borrowers appealed the judgment order to the Seventh Circuit. Id.


    The Seventh Circuit began the opinion by considering its jurisdiction. It noted that, in HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Townsend, 793 F. 3d 771, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2015), it held that Illinois foreclosure judgments were not final orders. The Townsendmajority reasoned that Illinois foreclosure judgments were not final because the order did not resolve all the issues in the lawsuit. Specifically: (1) the owner retained statutory rights to redeem the property before the sale; (2) a judicial sale would still need to be confirmed in a further court proceeding; and (3) the court would still need to decide the amount of deficiency, if any. Id. at 775-77. The Seventh Circuit held that Townsend controlled the issue of appellate jurisdiction, and it was not material that the bank in this case was not seeking a deficiency. Martinson, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12402 at *5.


    The Seventh Circuit then had to resolve another difference between the present case and Townsend. The outcome in Townsend, 793 F. 3d at 777, resulted from the court’s holding that, under Illinois law, foreclosure judgments are not final and generally cannot be appealed until the sale is confirmed. But this case was different—it involved an appeal regarding a Wisconsin foreclosure judgment, and the court acknowledged that Wisconsin courts invariably treat foreclosure judgments as final and appealable orders. Martinson, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12402 at *5-6; see also Anchor Sav. & Loan v. Coyle, 148 Wis. 2d 94, 100-01 (“[T]he judgment of foreclosure and sale disposes of the entire matter in litigation and is a final judgment as a matter of right . . . . [t]he proceedings after the judgment . . . are analogous to the execution of a judgment and simply enforce the parties’ rights which have been adjudicated[.]”).


    Despite Wisconsin law, the Seventh Circuit held that Townsend controlled in this case because Townsend applied a federal standard of finality—“a procedural issue governed by federal law.” Martinson, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 12402 at *6 (citing Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988)). Congress’s use of “final decisions” in section 1291 did not mean to incorporate state law, and a “final decision” in federal court is one “which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Budinich, 486 U.S. at 199.


    The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that it would create a significant “and potentially treacherous” difference between state and federal forums if it held that a Wisconsin state court foreclosure judgment was an appealable order but a Wisconsin federal district court judgment was not. However, it reasoned that, if it did not follow Townsend and apply a federal standard of finality, it would create an in-circuit conflict about federal procedural law, and the more palatable option was to be consistent in applying federal procedure “and to accept the inevitable potential for confusion based on the difference between federal and state procedure in such cases.” Martinson, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 12402 at *6.


    As a result, the court held that Townsend’s application of a federal standard of finality is binding in the Seventh Circuit, decided that the foreclosure judgment in this case was not a final order, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.


DISCLAIMER: The Appellate Lawyers Association does not provide legal services or legal advice. Discussions of legal principles and authority, including, but not limited to, constitutional provisions, statutes, legislative enactments, court rules, case law, and common-law doctrines are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice.

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