The appellate court has again warned litigants and practitioners that when filing an amended complaint after the dismissal of a claim, in order to preserve appellate review of the claim’s dismissal, the claim must be, at a minimum, referred to in all subsequent amended complaints.  In Rubin and Norris, LLC v. Panzarella, 2016 IL App (1st) 141315, ¶¶ 27-33, the First District Appellate Court held that plaintiff, Rubin and Norris, LLC,forfeited review of the dismissal of its breach of contract count because its amended complaint did not refer to or adopt the dismissed count. In doing so, the court, citing the Second District’s holding in Gaylor v. Campion, Curran, Rausch, Gummerson & Dunlop, P.C., 2012 IL App (2d) 110718, described three methods for preserving appellate review of a dismissed claim in a multi-count complaint.

First, the plaintiff may stand on the dismissed counts, take a voluntary dismissal of the remaining counts, and argue the matter on appeal. Rubin and Norris, LLC, 2016 IL App (1st) 141315, ¶ 30. Second, the plaintiff may file an amended pleading that re-alleges, incorporates by reference, or refers to the dismissed counts. Id. As noted in Rubin and Norris, LLC, “[a] simple paragraph or footnote in the amended pleadings notifying defendants and the court that plaintiff is preserving the dismissed portions of the former complaints for appeal is sufficient.” Id. (quoting Tabora v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 279 Ill. App. 3d 108, 114 (1996)). Third, the plaintiff may perfect an appeal from the dismissal order prior to filing an amended pleading that does not refer to or adopt the dismissed counts. Id.

In Rubin and Norris, LLC, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s breach of contract claim in its original complaint with prejudice (id. ¶ 17), and plaintiff filed an amended complaint asserting only a quantum meruit claim and did not refer to or adopt the breach of contract claim. Id. ¶ 33. By doing so, the appellate court held plaintiff had “abandoned and withdrawn” the breach of contract claim, eliminating it from consideration on appeal.

Id.

The appellate court followed the Foxcroftforfeiture rule: “[w]here an amendment is complete in itself and does not refer to or adopt the prior pleading, the earlier pleading ceases to be a part of the record for most purposes, being in effect abandoned and withdrawn.” Foxcroft Townhome Owners Ass’n v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 96 Ill. 2d 150, 153-54 (1983). In addition to promoting the efficient and orderly administration of justice, the court explained, the forfeiture rule also preserves fairness for defendants and aids the court. Rubin and Norris, LLC, 2016 IL App (1st) 141315, ¶ 31.

When a plaintiff files an amended complaint that does not reference claims from an earlier complaint, a defendant can expect that those allegations are no longer at issue. And the appellate court should not have to guess whether or not claims are preserved for appeal. As the court noted, “[h]ad [plaintiff] intended to abandon the breach of contract claim that was dismissed with prejudice from the original complaint, the record in this case might very well look exactly the same.” Id. ¶

The court’s reminder is an important one. Something as small as a simple paragraph or footnote in the plaintiff’s amended complaint would have preserved the dismissal of the breach of contract count for appeal.

Last month, the Illinois Supreme Court amended various rules governing appellate practice. Specifically, on March 8, 2016, the court amended Rules 304(b)(6) (Judgments and Orders Appealable without a Special Finding), 306(a)(5) (Interlocutory Appeals by Permission), 306(b) (Procedure for Interlocutory Appeals by Permission), 310.1 (Appellate Settlement Conference Program), 311 (Accelerated Docket), and 312 (Docketing Statement). These amendments became effective immediately. As noted in the respective committee comments, the amendments reflect the recent changes to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, Pub. Act 99-90 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 750 ILCS 5/101 et seq.), which changed the terms “Custody,” “Visitation” (as to parents) and “Removal” to “Allocation of Parental Responsibilities,” “Parenting Time” and “Relocation.” 

Also on March 8, 2016, and effective immediately, the Supreme Court amended Rule 367(c), governing petitions for rehearing. The rule mandates that petitions for rehearing in the Supreme Court shall be mailed to the Report of Decisions at 207 W. Jefferson, Suite 305, Bloomington, Illinois 61701.

Finally, the Supreme Court amended Rule 604(d), which pertains to appeals by defendants from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea. The amendment removed the words "If a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty is to be filed[.]"

That portion of the rule now provides:  "The defendant's attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain defendant's contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings."

On March 15, 2016, the Supreme Court amended Rule 315 effective immediately. Subsection (d) and (f), respectively, each now allow for a 7,000 word limitation on petitions for leave to appeal and answers. Subsection (i) accounted for the amendments to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act noted above. 

The amendments can be found here (March 8 order) and here (March 15 order).

In National Life Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. International Bank of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 151446, the First District Appellate Court confronted an issue rarely tackled by Illinois appellate courts: When does an order entered in supplementary proceedings become “final” for purposes of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(4) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)? In National Life, after a $3,424,228.97 judgment had been entered against the defendant Ronald S. Scarlato (Scarlato) and two limited liability corporations, plaintiff National Life Real Estate Holdings, LLC (National Life) initiated supplementary proceedings and filed a third-party citation to discover assets against International Bank of Chicago (IBC). National Life, 2016 IL App (1st) 151446, ¶¶ 1, 3.

The citation stated that IBC was prohibited from “making or allowing any transfer or other disposition of, or interfering with, any property *** belonging to the judgment debtor.” Id. ¶ 3. Several months after IBC was served with the citation, IBC, Scarlato and others entered into a construction loan agreement and promissory note wherein IBC agreed to loan Scarlato and other entities $3.5 million. Id. ¶ 4. The loan proceeds were disbursed to various third parties, but none were distributed to Scarlato. Id.

Thereafter, National Life filed a motion for entry of judgment under section 2-1402 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1402 (West 2012)), claiming that IBC violated the prohibitive wording of the citation and the lien created thereby by transferring $3.5 million in assets that belonged to Scarlato. National Life, 2016 IL App (1st) 151446, ¶ 5. IBC opposed the motion on the grounds that the loan proceeds were not Scarlato’s “property,” and therefore, it did not violate the citation. Id.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied National Life’s motion for entry of judgment against IBC, finding that the loan proceeds were neither Scarlato’s individually nor delivered to Scarlato. Id.¶¶ 5-6. The trial court’s written memorandum decision stated, “[T]he parties do have remedies remaining.” Id. ¶ 6. The order did not contain a finding pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). National Life, 2016 IL App (1st) 151446, ¶ 11. National Life subsequently filed a notice of appeal. Id.¶ 7.

Addressing IBC’s jurisdictional challenge, the Appellate Court first examined the language of Rule 304(b)(4), which provides that “[a] final judgment or order entered in a proceeding under section 2-1402 of the Code” is appealable without the finding required for appeals under Rule 304(a). (Emphasis added). Id. ¶¶ 9-10. “An order in a section 2-1402 proceeding is said to be final when the citation petitioner [here, National Life] is in a position to collect against the debtor or a third[-]party, or the citation petitioner has been ultimately foreclosed from doing so.” Id. ¶ 10 (citing D’Agostino v. Lynch, 382 Ill. App. 3d 639, 642 (2008)). Thus, the Appellate Court had to determine “whether the court’s order denying entry of judgment against IBC put National Life in a position to collect against IBC, or whether National Life was ultimately foreclosed from doing so.” Id. ¶ 11.

After noting the sparsity of Illinois case law on the finality of orders entered in supplementary proceedings, the Appellate Court found In re Marriage of McElwee, 230 Ill. App. 3d 714 (1992) most analogous. National Life, 2016 IL App (1st) 151446, ¶¶ 12-13. McElwee involved an appeal from an order allowing the divorce respondent’s non-wage garnishment to go forward in order to collect a foreign judgment. Id. ¶ 13. Dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the McElwee court reasoned: “What is essential for purposes of Rule 304(b)(4) is that there be finality with respect to the supplemental garnishment proceeding. * * * [The order] did not operate to terminate any part of the garnishment. Rather, its effect was simply to allow that garnishment to go forward.” Id. ¶ 13 (quoting In re Marriage of McElwee, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 719).

Likewise, the trial court’s order in National Life denying National Life’s motion for entry of judgment against IBC “simply allowed the supplementary proceeding to go forward and placed the parties at the beginning of the third-party citation proceedings, not the end.” Id. ¶ 14. The order did not “ultimately foreclose” National Life from proceeding against IBC or prohibit National Life from pursuing other post-judgment remedies pursuant to its third-party citation to discover assets against IBC, which was still pending. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. The court’s order did not dismiss National Life’s citation against IBC. Id. ¶16. Rather, the order simply denied the relief sought in National Life’s motion, i.e., the entry of judgment against IBC for violation of section 2-1402 of the Code. Id. ¶ 15.

Because National Life was not ultimately foreclosed from collecting against IBC, the trial court’s April 15, 2015 order denying National Life’s motion for entry of judgment was not final for purposes of Rule 304(b)(4). Id. ¶ 16. Accordingly, the Court dismissed National Life’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.

A recent rule change impacting appellate court briefs provides an opportunity for attorneys to experiment with typography—the general character or appearance of printed matter—and choose fonts with superior readability than Times New Roman. 

Beginning on January 1, 2016, Supreme Court Rule 341(b) was amended to provide an alternate limit to an appellate brief’s length. Now, instead of solely being bound by page limits, litigants are alternatively bound by word limits—15,000 words for appellants’ and appellees’ briefs, and 7,000 words for reply briefs. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(b). This rule change ends the need to use smaller, less readable typeface to meet page limits to avoid sacrificing arguments in a complex or multi-faceted appeal.

Typography impacts readability in brief-length documents. In Professor Ruth Anne Robbins’ article, Painting with Print: Incorporating Concepts of Typographic and Layout Design into the Text of  Legal Writing Documents, she presents basic and valuable concepts of visual design such as contrast, organization, justification, and the use of all capital letters. Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Directors, Vol. 2, at 108-34 (2004). She notes that “the look of the words themselves affects visual perception. Thus, even with text alone, legal writers can create a picture using typography as paint on the canvas of the page.” Id. at 110. Simply put, “[t]he more readable the document, the more likely the reader will remember the content.” Id.

at 113.   

Broadly speaking, fonts are distinguishable by two types of attributes. First, type can be proportionally spaced, meaning that the more narrow letters take up less space on the page, or monospaced, meaning that each letter takes up the same amount of width regardless of the natural letter shape. Id.at 121. Second, font can be “serif” or “sans serif.” A “serif” or “wing” font has small horizontal or vertical strokes at the ends of the lines that make up the letters. See id. at 119. Examples of “serif” fonts are Times New Roman and Garamond. “Sans serif” fonts, such as Arial, have no extra strokes at the end of the letter line. Id. Professor Robbins asserts that “[t]he popular view among graphic design experts is to use serif fonts” for large blocks of text. Id. at 119. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals even provides a link to Professor Robbins’ article on its homepage. See http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/ (last accessed March 24, 2016).

The Seventh Circuit expounds on the choice of font in appellate briefs in its “Requirements and Suggestions for Typography in Briefs and Other Papers.” See http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules/type.pdf (last accessed March 24, 2016). It advises, “[y]ou can improve your chances by making your briefs typographically superior. It won’t make your arguments better, but it will ensure that judges grasp and retain your points with less struggle.” Id. at 4. It expressly criticizes Times New Roman as a font choice, noting that, “The Times of London chose the typeface Times New Roman to serve an audience looking for a quick read. Lawyers don’t want their audience to read fast and throw the document away; they want to maximize retention.” Id. at 3. Instead, the Seventh Circuit suggests choosing font with a larger “x-height”—where the letter “x” is taller in relation to a capital letter. Id.at 5. 

By way of example, the Seventh Circuit offers that both the United States Supreme Court and Solicitor General use Century font, and professional typographers set books in New Baskerville, Book Antiqua, Bookman Old Style, and many other proportionally spaced “serif” faces. Id. “Now that only words count,” it commends, “everyone gains from a more legible typeface, even if that means extra pages.” Id.

Now that Illinois courts of review accept word limits for briefs, practitioners should seize the opportunity to select what they believe is the most readable typeface. As the Seventh Circuit notes, it won’t guarantee victory, but enhanced ease of reading and increased retention for judges and their clerks can only benefit the appellate practitioner.

On March 30, 2016, the Illinois Supreme Court entered a supervisory order in a case involving the timeliness of a notice of appeal filed (and file-stamped) via a self-service kiosk made available through the Cook County Clerk's office. 

In Daniel v. Ripoli, 2015 IL App (1st) 122607-U, the appellate court reviewed the issue of appellate jurisdiction on rehearing after having already ruled on the merits of the appeal (as well as a cross-appeal). The appellate court determined that the record failed to adequately demonstrate appellate jurisdiction over the primary appeal where the notice of appeal was filed at such a kiosk and the record did not contain other evidence of filing, such as a notice of filing or certificate of service. The potential for abuse and the absence of meaningful security measures in connection with the use of the kiosks, the court held, rendered the clerk's file-stamp, standing alone, insufficient to establish that the notice of appeal was timely surrendered to the "exclusive control of the clerk." Id. ¶ 73. The appellate court thus dismissed the primary appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction, and affirmed the trial court's ruling with respect to the issues raised on cross-appeal. Id. ¶¶ 87, 110. See ALA Blog Post, Illinois Appellate Court Rules That Filing Via Kiosk Fails to Establish Timely Notice of Appeal (Jan. 4, 2016).

The Illinois Supreme Court on March 30, 2016, denied the appellant's petition for leave to appeal but entered a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its jurisdictional ruling and consider the appeal on the merits. It is unclear whether the supreme court's supervisory order signals an implicit recognition of the reliability of file-stamps obtained from such kiosks. Additionally, it remains to be seen whether the appellate court will address the jurisdictional issue on further consideration, and/or whether the appellate court will merely reinstate its prior merits-based ruling, which was entered before it reconsidered the issue of appellate jurisdiction.

  The Association will host two events during the next month. On April 6, 2016, the ALA will host “Reel Appeal: Legal Ethics in the Movies,” moderated by Judge James E. Lockemy of the South Carolina Court of Appeals, at the John Marshall Law School. The event will use film as an avenue to discuss ethical questions appellate judges and attorneys face in their careers on a daily basis. The panelists will include Professor Paul Bergman of the UCLA School of Law and co-author of the book Reel Justice: The Courtroom Goes to the Movies, Kirsten M. Castañeda of Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP in Dallas, and Mark Kressel of Horvitz & Levy LLP in Los Angeles. Attendees will receive 1 hour of MCLE ethics credit.

On April 12, 2016, the ALA’s annual roundtable luncheon featuring the justices of the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, will be held at The Centre of Elgin, Heritage Ballroom in Elgin. Space permitting, attendees will enjoy lunch with an individual justice, as each jurist will be seated at a separate table. Attendees will have the rare opportunity to ask the justices for tips and practice pointers in a casual and cordial atmosphere. Attendees will receive 1 hour of MCLE credit.

For more information and to register, please click here.

   The Illinois Appellate Court recently issued an opinion finding that the appellant had forfeited an issue on appeal. Although the main issue of the case was whether the Montreal Convention - a treaty that governs the international carriage of passengers, baggage, and cargo - governed the parties' dispute, which the appellate court held it did, the case also demonstrates the importance of preserving issues for appellate review.

In El-Zoobi v. United Airlines, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 150813, plaintiff Sam El-Zoobi was a passenger on a United Airlines flight to China when an announcement was made asking all passengers to turn off their electronic devices. Id. ¶ 3. Flight attendant Janet Tucker observed defendant using his cell phone and asked him to turn it off. El-Zoobi told her the phone was in "airplane mode" and insisted that was sufficient. Id. Tucker alerted the lead flight attendant, Brenda Dismuke, who also told El-Zoobi to turn off his cell phone. El-Zoobi again refused. Id.

Dismuke told the plane's pilots about El-Zoobi and his refusal to turn off his cell phone. Id. A pilot went to speak with El-Zoobi, and when he returned to the cockpit, he told Dismuke that El-Zoobi was allegedly an employee of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Id. Eventually, plaintiff told Dismuke that he turned off his cell phone, and the flight took off as planned. Id. At some point during the flight, Dismuke decided to report plaintiff to the FAA. Id. ¶ 4. When the plane landed and after she arrived at her hotel, she filed a complaint against El-Zoobi on the FAA's website. Id. ¶ 5.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against United Airlines, alleging tortuous interference with a business relationship and intentional infliction of emotion distress. Id. ¶ 8. He stated that due to United Airlines' "false complaint," he lost an opportunity to be promoted, suffered a loss of other advancement opportunities and had severe emotional distress. Id.

In response, United Airlines filed a motion to dismiss El-Zoobi's compliant arguing his claim was governed by the Montreal Convention and he failed to state a valid claim for relief under the Convention. Id. The circuit court granted United Airlines' motion because El-Zoobi's alleged injury occurred on board an international flight, and thus, his claim was governed by the Convention (id.), which only allowed recovery for harm caused by accidents resulting in bodily harm. Id. ¶ 12. Furthermore, the Convention provides the sole remedy for passengers on board international flights. Id. ¶ 13. El-Zoobi appealed. Id. ¶ 8.

In addition to arguing on appeal that the Montreal Convention did not apply to his alleged injury (id. ¶ 10), El-Zoobi also argued that article 25 of the Montreal Convention contained an exception, allowing passengers to bring claims under local law if the alleged conduct if willful, including intentional tort claims. Id. ¶ 21. In addressing this argument, the appellate court found that El-Zoobi did not raise this argument in the circuit court, and accordingly, he forfeited arguing it on appeal. Id. The appellate court accordingly affirmed the circuit court's judgment, dismissing El-Zoobi's action. 
 

  On Thursday, March 10, 2016, the Association hosted its annual roundtable luncheon featuring the justices of the Illinois Appellate Court, First District. Held at the Union League Club in Chicago, the luncheon offered ALA members and guests the opportunity to interact with reviewing court jurists and to gain practice pointers from the court's perspective, all while enjoying lunch in a cordial atmosphere.

ALA Vice President Joanne Driscoll welcomed the attendees, which included many justices from the First District. Thereafter, Justice Robert Gordon offered insight on current court initiatives. Specifically, Justice Gordon remarked that the court is implementing mandatory e-filing pursuant to the Illinois Supreme Court's directive and also discussed implications of pro se filings and the Illinois Access to Justice commission. Of note, Justice Gordon discussed the court's effort to expand its mediation program, stating that the program currently gets "very little business." Justice Gordon encouraged the audience to explore appellate court mediation with their clients and offered the reminder that the service is free to parties, most cases settle, and no justice involved in the mediation will be on the panel if the case does not settle.

The ALA thanks the justices of the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, for another engaging and insightful luncheon.

  Judge Diane Woods, Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, appeared on Chicago Tonight recently to discuss various topics of interest to appellate lawyers.

In discussing the current vacancy at the United States Supreme Court, Judge Woods referred to the open seat as "a big loss," which, in the case of a 4-4 vote split, will leave the lower court's ruling in tact.

Judge Wood also described the Supreme Court vetting process as "very thorough," in which speeches from 20 years ago may be viewed and dissected.

The full video interview with Judge Wood is available here.

Cases Pending, edited by Clare J. Quish (pictured left) and Gretchen Sperry, has been updated to discuss the Illinois Supreme Court’s March Term that began today, with oral arguments scheduled for Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, March 15-17 and Tuesday, March 22, 2016. A total of 13 cases will be heard – 7 criminal and 6 civil. Here are the civil cases with the dates of oral argument:

Carney v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., No. 118984 – March 16

Fattah v. Bim, No. 119365 – March 17

Moline School District No. 40 Board of Education v. Hon. Pat Quinn, No. 119704 – March 17

Hampton v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, No. 119861 – March 17

Valfer v. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, No. 119220 – March 22

J & J Ventures Gaming, LLC v. Wild, Inc., Nos. 119870, 119871, 119872, 119873, 119874 (cons.) – March 22 
 
The Court will hear several cases of interest this term, including Fattah v. Bim involving the implied warranty of habitability and J & J Ventures Gaming, LLC v. Wild, Inc., a case interpreting the Illinois Gaming Act. Below are abbreviated summaries for these two cases. Summaries for all these cases can be accessed by ALA members on the ALA website by clicking on our Cases Pending publication.
 
CONSTRUCTION LAW – IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY

No. 119365
Fattah v. Bim

The issue presented in this appeal is whether a subsequent purchaser of a home is bound by the initial purchaser’s waiver of the implied warranty of habitability, such that the subsequent purchaser is precluded from suing the developer for latent defects.

Defendants were residential real estate developers and constructed a home for sale. They sold it to the initial purchaser, who executed a waiver and disclaimer of the implied warranty of habitability, which became part of the real estate contract by incorporation. The waiver stated that it was binding on the purchaser and her successors. Several years later, the initial purchaser sold the home to Plaintiff as-is. Four months after Plaintiff moved into the home, the porch collapsed. He sued Defendants asserting, among other things, a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Following a bench trial, the circuit court found in favor of Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff was bound by the initial purchaser’s waiver of the implied warranty of habitability. Additionally, the court noted that Plaintiff purchased the home as-is.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that the initial purchaser’s waiver was not binding on Plaintiff because he had no knowledge of the waiver executed by Defendants and the initial purchaser and was not a party to that agreement. Furthermore, the appellate court held that the as-is provision was an agreement between Plaintiff and the initial purchaser and was not a waiver of the implied warranty of habitability as to Defendants.

Appellate Court Decision: 2015 IL App (1st) 140171, 31 N.E.3d 922. Palmer, J., with McBride and Reyes, JJ., concurring.

PLA Allowed: 09/30/15

Oral Argument: 03/17/16

 

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION – ILLINOIS GAMING ACT

Nos. 119870, 119871, 119872, 119873, 119874 (cons.)
J & J Ventures Gaming, LLC v. Wild, Inc.

This consolidated appeal concerns the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction over contract disputes arising out of the operation of video gaming terminals.

Under the Illinois Gaming Act (the “Act”) (230 ILCS 40/1 et seq.), the operation of a video gaming terminal is governed by a written use agreement between the owner of the terminal license and the owner of the establishment. Plaintiff J & J Ventures Gaming claimed to have an exclusive right to operate video gaming terminals at various establishments pursuant to its written use agreement with those establishments. Accel Entertainment Gaming, LLC likewise claimed that it had the right to operate video gaming terminals at those establishments under written use agreements it acquired by assignment. Plaintiff filed lawsuits in the circuit court against five establishments seeking a declaration that it was entitled to operate the video gaming terminals in those establishments. Accel Entertainment Gaming moved to intervene in each of those lawsuits. Following the decision in Triple 7 Illinois, LLC v. Gaming & Entertainment Management-Illinois, LLC, 2013 IL App (3d) 120860, the circuit court found in favor of Plaintiff.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fifth District, declined to follow Triple 7 and instead determined sua sponte that the Act granted the Illinois Gaming Board exclusive authority to decide the question of which written use agreement was controlling as a matter of administrative law. Accordingly, the appellate court determined that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment actions, vacated the circuit court’s orders, and dismissed the appeals. The appellate court then issued a certificate of importance in each case pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 316, allowing them to be heard by the Illinois Supreme Court.

 

Appellate Court Decision: 2015 IL App (5th) 140092, 38 N.E.3d 194. Stewart, J., with Goldenhersh and Schwarm, JJ., concurring.

 

Certified cases – Supreme Court Rule 316: 09/23/15

Oral Argument: 03/22/16