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"The Brief" - The ALA Blog

  • February 09, 2016 6:43 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

      Mandatory individual arbitration agreements as a means of defeating class action lawsuits are a hot topic of late, and a recent decision from the Illinois Appellate Court has clarified the standard of proof and standard of decision parties and trial courts must meet to resolve disputes over the existence and enforceability of those agreements.


    In Sturgill v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 2016 IL App (5th) 140380, Franklin Sturgill brought a putative class action lawsuit against Santander, a financing company, alleging the company failed to deliver the certificate of title to his truck within the time provided by law following the satisfaction of a lien placed on it at the time of purchase. In line with a litigation trend that has skyrocketed since the U.S. Supreme Court decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), Santander moved to compel individual arbitration and dismiss or stay the suit. Santander claimed that Sturgill agreed to mandatory arbitration as a term of the financing agreement with Santander’s predecessor in interest. Sturgill contested whether Santander had inherited the right to compel arbitration and argued that, either way, the arbitration provision did not apply because his cause of action arose after the installment contract was satisfied. Both Santander and Sturgill’s arguments depended on several unresolved factual and legal questions. The trial court thus ordered limited discovery to address those issues, but when the parties failed to comply, the court summarily denied the motion to compel arbitration.

  • January 27, 2016 6:35 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

      On January 21, 2016, the Association gathered at the Union League Club of Chicago to host "The Roberts Court at Ten: A Reporter's Reflections" featuring Adam Liptak, the United States Supreme Court reporter for the New York Times.

    The Appellate Lawyers Association President Michael A. Scodro began the event by offering welcoming remarks as Association members and guests enjoyed lunch. President Scodro previewed future Association events, including one on February 17, 2016, at the Union League Club of Chicago, featuring Justices Diane Sykes and David Hamilton of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, who will discuss the various approaches judges use in statutory and constitutional interpretation. President Scodro also took a moment to recognize former Association President Judge Jean Prendergast Rooney, a "driving force of the" Association, who recently passed away.

    Liptak began his discussion previewing the three questions he intended to answer: (1) What the name the "Roberts Court" means? (2) What cases the United States Supreme Court has decided recently? and (3) What challenges he has faced covering the Supreme Court in an accelerated and fragmented news environment?

    Liptak discussed the diversity, and in some ways the lack thereof, of the Supreme Court. Liptak observed that for the first time in the Court's history, there are three women justices and no Protestant members, remarking that currently there are six Catholic and three Jewish members. However, Liptak noted that all the justices had either attended law school at Harvard or Yale, and only one justice did not previously serve on a federal appellate court.

    Currently, according to Liptak, there are five conservative members and four liberal members sitting on the Court. He noted that each liberal member had been appointed by a Democratic president while each conservative member had been appointed by a Republican president. Although this might seem customary, Liptak refuted that notion by pointing to various examples of liberal or moderate justices who were appointed by Republican presidents, such as Justice John Paul Stevens appointed by Gerald Ford, Justice David Souter appointed by George H.W. Bush and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor appointed by Ronald Reagan. Liptak explained that today, ideology appears to be the critical factor when appointing a justice to the Supreme Court rather than geographic diversity or judicial experience.

    Liptak expressed various conclusions about the "Roberts Court." First, because of its conservative majority, the Court itself under Justice Roberts has leaned toward conservative rulings, highlighted by various decisions involving guns, voting rights and campaign finance. Liptak opined that the defining shift in the Roberts Court's ideology was in 2006, when Justice Antonin Scalia, a conservative, replaced Justice O'Connor, a moderate.

    Finally, Liptak gave his unofficial slogan of the Roberts Court that "everything worth deciding is worth deciding twice," with the second decision often being the most impactful of the two. Liptak cited examples in campaign finance, voting rights, same-sex marriage and public unions.

    The event concluded with a question-and-answer session.

    The Association thanks Adam Liptak for an informative and enjoyable luncheon, and all of the guests for their attendance and participation.

  • January 14, 2016 6:33 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

      The Association's upcoming luncheon will feature Adam Liptak, the renowned New York Times journalist who covers the United States Supreme Court. Over the years, Liptak has provided unique insight on how the High Court operates behind the scenes. His recent article featured the case, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, No. 14-915, whose oral argument was held on Monday.

    In this highly anticipated case, the California law at issue requires public employees who do not join a union to still pay fees that compensate for the costs of collective bargaining. Ten California teachers contend they have a First Amendment right not to pay the union fees. The union argues that the non-members are trying to obtain a windfall, reaping the benefits of collective bargaining without paying for its costs.

    The importance of the Court's outcome in the case, Liptak noted, is that a ruling in favor of the teachers would represent a drastic blow to unions.

    Liptak observed that the Court's conservative majority seemed likely to agree with the teachers. The "best" hope unions have for a ruling in their favor, Liptak said, is Justice Antonin Scalia who has been sympathetic toward them in the past. However, Liptak observed a certain sense of hostility by Justice Scalia toward unions during oral arguments, especially when he proclaimed "[t]he problem is that everything that is collectively bargained with the government is within the political sphere, almost by definition."

    The liberal minority on the Court seemed focused, Liptak asserted, on a worthy reason to overturn past Supreme Court precedent, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which held in 1977 that forcing non-union members to pay for a union's collective bargaining efforts was constitutional.

  • January 12, 2016 6:22 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

       Cases Pending, edited by Clare J. Quish (pictured left) and Gretchen Sperry, has been updated to discuss the Illinois Supreme Court’s January Term that began Monday, January 11, 2016, with oral argumentsscheduled for Tuesday, January 12, 2016, and Thursday, January 14, 2016.  A total of 5 cases will be heard – 2 civil and 3 criminal. Here are the civil cases with the dates of oral argument:

     

    Jeffrey W. Vaughn v. The City of Carbondale, No. 119181—January 14

     

    Michael Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., No. 119518—January 14

     

    The Court will hear two civil cases of interest this term: Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, which involves res judicata as it pertains to involuntary dismissal of claims, and Vaughn v. City of Carbondale, which involves the Public Security Employee Benefits Act. Below are abbreviated summaries for these two cases. Summaries for these cases and others listed above can be found in our Cases Pending publication, accessible to ALA members on our website.

     PROCEDURE – RES JUDICATA

     No. 119518

     Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc.

     The issue in this case is whether an order dismissing a claim without prejudice under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the “Code”) (735 ILCS 5/2-615) becomes a final adjudication on the merits that bars any subsequent related litigation, where the dismissed claim is not refiled and the remaining claims are voluntarily dismissed after the time allowed for re-pleading expires.

     Plaintiffs Michael and Denise Richter, doing business as Rich-Lane Farms, filed a three-count complaint against Defendant Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., alleging various claims relating to consumer fraud and shareholder disputes.  The fraud claims were dismissed under section 2-615 of the Code, with leave to replead within 30 days.  Plaintiffs never refiled their fraud claims and, instead, proceeded on their claim seeking shareholder remedies.  They subsequently voluntarily dismissed their shareholder remedies claims under section 2-1009 of the Code.  Plaintiffs refiled their action less than one year later, again asserting claims for shareholder remedies and adding claims for fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.  Defendant moved to dismiss the refiled case under section 2-619 of the Code, arguing that the circuit court’s order dismissing the fraud claims became a final adjudication on the merits after Plaintiffs failed to refile those claims and then voluntarily dismissed their remaining claims. According to Defendant, Plaintiffs’ refiled action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  The circuit court agreed with Defendant and granted its motion to dismiss.

    The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s order dismissing the fraud claims under section 2-615 was not a final judgment.  The circuit court provided “no indication that anything was ‘absolutely and finally’ settled” when the fraud claims were dismissed; rather, by allowing Plaintiffs additional time to file amended claims, the circuit court concluded that Plaintiffs could cure their pleading defects.  Because the dismissal was not a final adjudication on the merits, it did not become a final, appealable order on the entry of voluntary dismissal, and could not act as a bar in a refiled case under the doctrine of res judicata.

     

    In its petition for leave to appeal, Defendant argued that the appellate court’s interpretation ignores the circuit court’s restrictions on Plaintiffs’ ability to replead.  Defendant argued that when Plaintiffs failed to replead within the time allowed, they lost the right to do so and the dismissal order became final. Thus, Defendant argued, Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata following their voluntary dismissal.

     

    Appellate Court Opinion:  2015 IL App (4th) 140613, 34 N.E.3d 617. Pope, P.J., with Turner, J., and Steigmann, J., concurring.

     

    PLA Allowed: September 30, 2015.

     

    PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ACT

     

    No. 119181

     

    Vaughn v. City of Carbondale

     

    The issue presented in this appeal is whether Plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction requiring the City of Carbondale to provide him and his spouse with lifetime health insurance benefits under the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (the “Act”) (820 ILCS 320/10).

     

    Plaintiff, a Carbondale police officer, was injured when he hit his head on his patrol car as he responded to a non-emergency call from a dispatcher.  Plaintiff completed his shift and then sought medical attention.  Plaintiff was removed from duty due to his injury.  Plaintiff later applied for and received an in line of duty pension.  The City of Carbondale also provided family health insurance while Plaintiff received his pension.  Plaintiff was then asked to submit to a medical examination.  He complied and was found fit to return to duty as a police officer.  The City of Carbondale then terminated his pension.  The decision was affirmed on administrative review but later reversed by the Fifth District Appellate Court which reinstated the pension based on a failure to provide Plaintiff due process.

     Plaintiff in the meantime sought a permanent injunction against the City of Carbondale requiring it to permanently provide him and his family with lifetime health insurance benefits under the PSEBA.  The circuit court found that Plaintiff did not suffer a catastrophic injury and dismissed the injunction complaint.  The Fifth District Appellate Court reversed and held that because Plaintiff was injured when he was responding to a dispatcher’s call, which could have been an emergency, he was entitled to benefits under the Act.

     

    The City of Carbondale argues in its petition for leave to appeal that Plaintiff did not satisfy the criteria to qualify for benefits under the Act.  Although the City acknowledged that while Plaintiff’s injury may have been “catastrophic” under section 10(a) of the Act, he was not injured while in fresh pursuit; was not responding to an emergency; was not injured while responding to an unlawful act of another; or injured in the investigation of a criminal act as expressly required under section 10(b) of the Act.  To the contrary, the City argues that the Fifth District Appellate Court created a new basis not provided for in the statute—that injuries sustained in responding to any call from a dispatcher, even if not an emergency, satisfies the section 10(b) criteria entitling an officer and his family to lifetime health insurance benefits.

     The City also argues that its ability to terminate benefits is not limited to a showing of fraud in the initial procurement of benefits, as the Appellate Court held.  The City instead contends that benefits may be terminated if Plaintiff is no longer eligible for such benefits or the benefits were improperly extended in the first instance.

    Appellate Court Opinion:  2015 IL App (5th) 140122. Welch, J., with Cates, P.J., and Goldenhersh, J., concurring.

    PLA Allowed:  September 30, 2015.

    The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s order dismissing the fraud claims under section 2-615 was not a final judgment.  The circuit court provided “no indication that anything was ‘absolutely and finally’ settled” when the fraud claims were dismissed; rather, by allowing Plaintiffs additional time to file amended claims, the circuit court concluded that Plaintiffs could cure their pleading defects.  Because the dismissal was not a final adjudication on the merits, it did not become a final, appealable order on the entry of voluntary dismissal, and could not act as a bar in a refiled case under the doctrine of res judicata.

    In its petition for leave to appeal, Defendant argued that the appellate court’s interpretation ignores the circuit court’s restrictions on Plaintiffs’ ability to replead.  Defendant argued that when Plaintiffs failed to replead within the time allowed, they lost the right to do so and the dismissal order became final. Thus, Defendant argued, Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata following their voluntary dismissal.

    Appellate Court Opinion:  2015 IL App (4th) 140613, 34 N.E.3d 617. Pope, P.J., with Turner, J., and Steigmann, J., concurring.

     PLA Allowed: September 30, 2015.

    PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ACT

    No. 119181

    Vaughn v. City of Carbondale

    The issue presented in this appeal is whether Plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction requiring the City of Carbondale to provide him and his spouse with lifetime health insurance benefits under the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (the “Act”) (820 ILCS 320/10).

     

    Plaintiff, a Carbondale police officer, was injured when he hit his head on his patrol car as he responded to a non-emergency call from a dispatcher.  Plaintiff completed his shift and then sought medical attention.  Plaintiff was removed from duty due to his injury.  Plaintiff later applied for and received an in line of duty pension.  The City of Carbondale also provided family health insurance while Plaintiff received his pension.  Plaintiff was then asked to submit to a medical examination.  He complied and was found fit to return to duty as a police officer.  The City of Carbondale then terminated his pension.  The decision was affirmed on administrative review but later reversed by the Fifth District Appellate Court which reinstated the pension based on a failure to provide Plaintiff due process.

     

    Plaintiff in the meantime sought a permanent injunction against the City of Carbondale requiring it to permanently provide him and his family with lifetime health insurance benefits under the PSEBA.  The circuit court found that Plaintiff did not suffer a catastrophic injury and dismissed the injunction complaint.  The Fifth District Appellate Court reversed and held that because Plaintiff was injured when he was responding to a dispatcher’s call, which could have been an emergency, he was entitled to benefits under the Act.

     

    The City of Carbondale argues in its petition for leave to appeal that Plaintiff did not satisfy the criteria to qualify for benefits under the Act.  Although the City acknowledged that while Plaintiff’s injury may have been “catastrophic” under section 10(a) of the Act, he was not injured while in fresh pursuit; was not responding to an emergency; was not injured while responding to an unlawful act of another; or injured in the investigation of a criminal act as expressly required under section 10(b) of the Act.  To the contrary, the City argues that the Fifth District Appellate Court created a new basis not provided for in the statute—that injuries sustained in responding to any call from a dispatcher, even if not an emergency, satisfies the section 10(b) criteria entitling an officer and his family to lifetime health insurance benefits.

     The City also argues that its ability to terminate benefits is not limited to a showing of fraud in the initial procurement of benefits, as the Appellate Court held.  The City instead contends that benefits may be terminated if Plaintiff is no longer eligible for such benefits or the benefits were improperly extended in the first instance.

    Appellate Court Opinion:  2015 IL App (5th) 140122. Welch, J., with Cates, P.J., and Goldenhersh, J., concurring.

     PLA Allowed:  September 30, 2015.

  • January 10, 2016 12:04 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

      The Association will once again host the Illinois Supreme Court Civil Cases Year-in-Review, an information-packed seminar featuring Illinois Appellate Court Justice Ann B. Jorgensen of the Second District, along with past ALA presidents J. Timothy Eaton and Michael T. Reagan. The panel will discuss the significant civil cases decided by the Illinois Supreme Court during the past year. 

     As in years' past, the seminar will be presented in multiple locations. The initial presentation will be held on January 21, 2016, at Maldaner’s Restaurant in Springfield. The panel will also present the seminar on January 28, 2016, in Chicago at Neal Gerber & Eisenberg LLP and on February 4, 2016, in Wheaton at the DuPage County Judicial Center.

    Justice Jorgensen began her practice as an assistant State’s Attorney in DuPage County. She then entered private practice before beginning her career in the judiciary as an Associate Judge in the 18th Judicial Circuit. In 2008, the Illinois Supreme Court appointed Justice Jorgensen to the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District.

    J. Timothy Eaton is a partner at Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP in Chicago where he concentrates his work in appellate practice, litigation, and energy and regulated industries. He was president of the ALA in 1989 and 1990.

    Michael T. Reagan has his own law firm in Ottawa where he focuses on appellate law and civil litigation. He was president of the ALA in 1995 and 1996.

    The ALA welcomes all to join our three speakers for an informative and engaging luncheon. For more information and to register, please click here.
    Participants will earn 1.5 hours of MCLE credit.

  • January 04, 2016 12:37 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

     In Daniel v. Ripoli, 2015 IL App (1st) 122607-U, the appellate court dismissed an appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because a date stamp obtained from a self-service filing kiosk utilized by the Cook County Clerk’s office was not a sufficiently reliable indicator that the notice of appeal had been filed in a timely manner.

    The Daniel case involved a business dispute among members of an accounting firm formed as a limited liability company. The estate of a deceased member sued both the LLC and the other members to recover distributions allegedly owed under the LLC’s operating agreement. The defendants contended that the operating agreement had been modified by a subsequent written agreement that permanently changed the distribution percentages to account for disparities in business production. The trial court rejected this contention, held that the changes effected by the subsequent agreement were not permanent, and awarded judgment in favor of the estate and against the LLC in the amount of $179,089.75. The trial court also rejected the estate’s attempt to impose individual liability on the other members of the LLC, and its request for distributions owed upon the death of plaintiff’s decedent. Both parties appealed.
     

    The appellate court originally ruled in favor of defendants. In a published decision dated January 28, 2015 (2015 IL App (1st) 122607), the court determined, among other things, that the parties’ later agreement permanently reduced the distributive share of the plaintiff’s decedent. The appellate court accordingly reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff estate; the court affirmed the other aspects of the trial court’s rulings. Id. ¶¶ 106-109.



    Regarding appellate jurisdiction, the appellate court observed in its original disposition that the defendants’ notice of appeal bore a filing stamp dated within thirty days of the trial court’s final judgment. Id. ¶ 56. Although it acknowledged that there was a “dearth of authority directly so holding,” the court observed that “the file-stamp date has generally been considered by this court as the time of receipt by the clerk of the court.” Id. ¶ 57. The appellate court rejected the estate’s argument that this general rule should not apply because the file-stamp in Daniel was obtained at a self-service kiosk: “We find no supreme court rule or precedent holding that such file stamps are somehow ineffective or are not construed in the same manner as having a court clerk physically file-stamp a notice of appeal.” Id. ¶ 58.
     
    Following the issuance of its decision, the court reconsidered, and reversed, its determination that the record established the existence of appellate jurisdiction. Based in part of the Illinois Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Huber v. American Accounting Association, 2014 IL 117293 (holding that a label purchased from an automated postal center was not sufficient to establish proof of mailing under Supreme Court Rule 373’s so-called “mailbox rule”), the appellate court in Daniel held on rehearing that a file stamp obtained from a self-service filing kiosk did not sufficiently establish that the notice of appeal was timely surrendered to the “exclusive control of the clerk.” Daniel, 2015 IL App (1st) 122607-U, ¶ 73. The absence of both security against abuse and meaningful procedures for the retrieval and filing of documents deposited in such kiosks, the court held, renders such filings unreliable, standing alone, to establish a filing date. The court noted several possibilities that undermined such reliability by allowing for a delay between a party’s stamping of the document and the clerk’s actual possession of it (for example, stamping a document one day and depositing it for filing on a subsequent day). Id. ¶ 74. The court also noted that the record did not contain a notice of filing or certificate of service regarding the notice of appeal, id. ¶ 81, a fact the court found “particularly vexing,” – “so that even if we decided that the word of an officer of the court overcomes our reluctance to rely on the kiosk stamp, in this case we do not have the documents of record to make that determination.” Id. ¶ 86.
     
    The court thus dismissed the defendants’ appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court stated: “We caution that relying on the date stamp from a self-service kiosk, particularly on time-sensitive documents, without more, is an invitation to trouble.” Id. ¶ 57. The court then addressed, and affirmed the trial court’s rulings with respect to, the estate’s cross-appeal. Id. ¶¶ 87-109. The Rule 23 Order did not address appellate jurisdiction to entertain the cross-appeal where the primary appeal was dismissed.


  • December 23, 2015 9:07 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    On January 21, 2016, the Association will host a luncheon at the Union League Club in Chicago featuring Adam Liptak of the New York Times. Liptak will speak about the United States Supreme Court the past 10 years under Chief Justice John Roberts. Not only will Liptak discuss the impactful stories from the Court the past decade, but he will also reflect on his own experiences covering the Court.


    Liptak, an attorney by trade, joined the Times in 2002, first covering the Court in the fall of 2008. Liptak was a finalist for the 2009 Pulitzer Prize in explanatory reporting for his series, "American Exception," which explored the differences between the American legal system and those of other developed nations. 

    Liptak originally was a copyboy for the Times after graduating from Yale University. He eventually returned to Yale, and in 1988, he graduated from its law school. After law school, Liptak spent four years working as a litigation associate at Cahill Gordon & Reindel in New York City, specializing in First Amendment cases. In 1992, he returned to the Times, working in its legal department. Liptak has taught media law at Columbia University's School of Journalism, the University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law and Yale Law School.

    The ALA welcomes all to join Adam Liptak for an informative and engaging luncheon. For more information and to register, please click here.


    Participants will earn one hour of MCLE credit.


  • December 20, 2015 10:28 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    The Association’s upcoming January luncheon will feature Adam Liptak, the renowned New York Times journalist who covers the United States Supreme Court. Last week, Liptak wrote an article focused on controversial state laws that make it a crime for motorists suspected of driving drunk to refuse blood, breath or urine tests. Currently, 13 states have such laws. 


    The Court consolidated three different cases into one: Bernard v. Minnesota, No. 14-1470. In Bernard, William Bernard refused to take a breath test after his arrest for suspected drunk driving. In Minnesota, it is a crime for someone arrested for driving while impaired to refuse to submit to a chemical test of that person's blood, urine or breath to detect the presence of alcohol. Bernard challenged the Minnesota law. In rejecting his challenge to the law, the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that because Bernard was arrested, the search of his person was permissible in connection therewith. 

    Liptak said that the defendants in the consolidated case are being represented by lawyers affiliated with Yale Law School's Supreme Court Clinic. The defendants noted that review of these laws are necessary because they " 'affect many thousands of people every year.' "


  • December 14, 2015 6:57 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    The Association’s upcoming January luncheon will feature Adam Liptak, the renowned New York Timesjournalist who covers the United States Supreme Court. Last week, Liptak wrote multiple articles on oral arguments before the Court, including on Fisher v. University of Texas, No. 14-981 and Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940. Liptak's article on Fisher may be found here while his article on Evenwel may be found here


    In Fisher, the plaintiff, Abigail Fisher, a white student, alleged that the University of Texas denied her admission because of her race. She challenged the school's admission plan which did not make race a deciding factor, but rather one element in considering the applicant's attractiveness. Liptak noted that based on the justices' "skeptical" questions to the attorneys representing the University of Texas, it appeared that the University's affirmative action plan would be held unconstitutional.

    Justice Scalia suggested that minority students with inferior academic credentials might do better at "a less advanced school" or "a slower-track school." Chief Justice Roberts wondered "[w]hat unique perspective does a minority student bring to a physics class?"

    Liptak noted that, in particular, Justice Kennedy appeared "frustrated" that the Court had encountered the Fisher case again. After all, in 2013, the Court remanded Fisher back to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit so that it could apply the proper strict scrutiny analysis to the University's plan. However, Fisher made its way back to the Court, where Justice Kennedy opined that "[w]e’re just arguing the same case … as if nothing had happened."

    Some of the liberal justices, specifically Justice Breyer, wondered if the Court was about to "kill affirmative action through a death by a thousand cuts."

    Justice Kagan recused herself from the case because of her involvement in the case as Solicitor General of the United States.

    Also noteworthy was that oral arguments lasted 95 minutes, where a typical case is argued in only 60 minutes.

    In Evenwel, Liptak observed that the question presented is what the "one person, one vote" principle means when creating voting districts. Do states and other localities count all residents or merely eligible voters? The current practice is to count all residents.

    The case was brought by individuals who were challenging voting districts for the Texas Senate.

    Liptak noted that people living in the United States who are ineligible to vote—for example, children and immigrants—usually are concentrated in urban areas which tend to favor Democrats. Meanwhile, rural areas, which tend to favor Republicans, tend to have a higher percentage of eligible voters. Thus, he observed, the resolution of the case has the potential to provide a "big boost to Republican voters in state legislative races in large parts of the nation."

    Liptak also observed that the justices' particular political leanings were indicative of whether they thought counting all residents or only eligible voters was proper. During oral arguments, the Court's four Democratic appointees asked questions suggesting that counting all residents was the proper protocol while the Court's five Republican appointees asked questions suggesting that counting just eligible voters was proper.

    Chief Justice Roberts opined, "[i]t is called 'one person one vote,' " which "seems designed to protect voters."

    Justice Sotomayor differed, stating "[t]here is a voting interest, but there is also a representation interest." Liptak suggested that Justice Sotomayor meant that politicians do not just represent eligible voters, but rather all constituents.


  • December 12, 2015 8:40 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    On December 9, 2015, the Illinois Supreme Court announced a series of amendments to the Illinois Supreme Court Rules. A full set of those rule amendments can be found here:

    A number of those amendments affect appellate practice, principally in the following ways:

    1. New word limits for appellate briefs: The Court amended Rules 341 and 367 to provide word limits for appellate briefs. Practitioners are given the alternative of complying with the new word limits or complying with the pre-existing page limits. The word limits are: 15,000 words for the appellant’s brief and the appellee’s brief; 7,000 words for the appellant’s reply brief; an additional 8,400 words for cross-appellants and cross-appellees; an additional 7,000 words for the cross-appellant’s reply brief; 8,000 words for a rehearing petition and an answer to a rehearing petition; and 3,500 words for a reply in support of a rehearing petition. The amendment will be effective January 1, 2016.

    The ALA endorsed the adoption of word limits at the Supreme Court Rules Committee’s public hearing in July, based on our members’ widely shared view that word limits, as opposed to page limits, would encourage practitioners to use more reader-friendly formats and fonts. ALA member Alyssa Reiter has been championing this change for a long time and deserves much credit for paving the way for this development.

    The proposal that the Supreme Court adopted today was made by the CBA’s Special Committee on Appellate Practice, which is co-chaired by past ALA Presidents Tim Eaton and Mike Rathsack. ALA Rules Committee member Jon Amarilio also was instrumental in the adoption of this proposal.

    2. E-mail service: Rule 11 has been amended to mandate the inclusion of an attorney’s email address on his or her appearance and on “all pleadings filed in court,” and otherwise to streamline the rules governing electronic service. The Court also adopted the ALA’s proposed amendments to Rules 306(b), 307(d)(1) and 307(d)(2), which were intended to clarify that service via e-mail is permitted. This amendment will also be effective on January 1, 2016.

DISCLAIMER: The Appellate Lawyers Association does not provide legal services or legal advice. Discussions of legal principles and authority, including, but not limited to, constitutional provisions, statutes, legislative enactments, court rules, case law, and common-law doctrines are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice.

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