Menu
Log in


"The Brief" - The ALA Blog

  • October 08, 2015 6:00 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    The Association recently kicked off the bar year with a luncheon featuring Professor David Strauss of the University of Chicago Law School. Held on October 1, 2015, at the Union League Club in Chicago, attendees earned valuable CLE credit as Professor Strauss provided keen insight on significant cases the Supreme Court will decide this term. 


    ALA President Michael A. Scodro opened the luncheon by welcoming ALA members and guests, which included judges from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and the Illinois Appellate Court.

    Thereafter, Professor Strauss—who has argued 18 cases before the High Court and also serves as co-editor of the Supreme Court Review—began his remarks by noting that, while the upcoming term may not involve a once-in-a-lifetime decision, the Supreme Court will address many significant issues. Of note, the Court will hear two seemingly repeat cases from recent terms.  

    In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 14-981, the justices will once again consider affirmative action in university admissions under the equal protection clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. In Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 14-915, the Supreme Court will again take up the issue of whether mandatory public sector union dues violate the First Amendment. Professor Strauss commented that it is unusual for the Court to revisit issues from previous terms, but cautioned that it could not serve as a prediction for how the Court will ultimately rule. 

    Professor Strauss also discussed the  Supreme Court’s decision to address the one-person, one-vote doctrine under the equal protection clause. In Evenwel v. Abbott, 14-940, the justices will decide whether the doctrine is based on total population, or must be based on total voter population, when apportioning state legislative districts. Professor Strauss noted that the case could have major political implications, as non-citizens historically tend to congregate toward urban areas. 

    Professor Strauss closed the luncheon with a question-and-answer session. In doing so, Professor Strauss agreed with a questioner that the Supreme Court appears to be more willing to take a case from the top down, that is, use concurring and dissenting opinions to signal to the bar that an issue is ripe for review. 


    The Association thanks Professor Strauss for his engaging and insightful comments. 


  • September 30, 2015 9:00 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    The September 29, 2015 issue of the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin (accessible at the Law Bulletin's website through a paywall subscription) featured a front page story on the unanimous nature of a large percentage of opinions issued by the Illinois Supreme Court, particularly in civil appeals. The article noted that, according to some court watchers, 86 percent of recent opinions were unanimous.


    The story quoted ALA President Michael A. Scodro, former Illinois Solicitor General and currently of Jenner & Block LLP.  Scodro noted that unanimous decisions present the state high court with the opportunity to speak "with one voice," which is particularly helpful in cases where lawyers or the public predict a fractured court. The story also quoted past ALA President J. Timothy Eaton, who shared his belief that the supreme court strives to be unanimous on interpretation of both common law and statutory law "so practitioners in the state can know what to expect."


  • September 18, 2015 5:58 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    As a reminder, ALA members enjoy complimentary and exclusive access to Cases Pending, a publication that provides extensive information on cases currently pending before the Illinois Supreme Court. Edited by ALA Treasurer Clare Quish (pictured on left) and former ALA Director Gretchen Sperry (pictured on right), Cases Pending can be accessed at the Association’s website.

    The Illinois Supreme Court’s September Term that began Monday, September 14, 2015, with oral arguments scheduled for Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, September 15-17, 2015, and next Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, September 22-24, 2015. A total of 22 cases will be heard – 9 civil and 13 criminal.

    Here are the civil cases with the dates of oral argument:

    Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, No. 118129—September 17

    The Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, Nos. 118043, 118072 (cons.)—September 22

    The State of Illinois v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, No. 118422—September 23

    Petrovic v. The Department of Employment Security, No. 118562—September 23

    Blumenthal v. Brewer, No. 118781 – September 23

    Christopher B. Burke Engineering, Ltd. v. Heritage Bank of Central Illinois, No. 118955 – September 23

    1010 Lake Shore Association v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., No. 118372—September 24

    People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Patrick McGuire v. Cornelius, No. 118975—September 24

    Bowman v. Ottney, No. 119000—September 24

    To read previews for two of these cases, please continue reading this post. 



    The Court will hear several cases of interest this term, including Blumenthal v. Brewer, which involves property rights for same-sex domestic partners, and a case addressing the State’s obligation to pay increased wages under a collective bargaining agreement although the legislature did not appropriate sufficient funds to do so. Below are abbreviated summaries for these two cases. Summaries for these cases and others listed above can be found in our Cases Pending publication, accessible to ALA members on our website. 


    UNJUST ENRICHMENT – SAME-SEX DOMESTIC PARTNERS



    No. 118781 

    Blumenthal v. Brewer

    The issue in this case is whether the Appellate Court properly disregarded the 1979 Illinois Supreme Court case of Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49 (1979) and permitted claims for implied contract arising out of the parties’ non-marital cohabitation to proceed.

    The parties in this case are two same-sex partners who were involved in a long-term relationship of 26 years. During that time, the parties raised several children together and “intentionally comingled and shared their assets based on a mutual commitment and expectation of a lifelong relationship.” Upon the dissolution of their relationship, the plaintiff sued to partition a home she jointly owned with the defendant. The defendant counterclaimed, alleging that she was entitled to a portion of the parties’ jointly acquired assets under theories of constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. Relying on our Supreme Court’s decision in Hewitt, which prohibited such claims between unmarried cohabitants, the trial court dismissed the defendant’s counterclaims and she appealed.

    The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, found that much of Hewitt’s underlying authority had been abandoned or superseded, noting that subsequent amendments to the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (750 ILCS 45/3 (West 2012)), the Illinois Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/2-2 (West 2012)), and the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/1-104.2 (West 2012)) have extended certain rights to the children of unmarried parents, implicitly signaling a shift in Illinois public policy away from disfavoring such relationships. Accordingly, the First District reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaims for equitable relief and remanded with instructions to consider the plaintiff’s remaining arguments regarding the sufficiency of those claims.

    In her petition for leave to appeal, the plaintiff argues that the First District acted beyond its jurisdiction by refusing to follow Hewitt, and further reinstated the concept of common-law marriage by potentially affording rights previously only available to married parties (such as the right to an equitable division of property pursuant to section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2012)) to the litigants below.

    Appellate Court Opinion: 2014 IL App (1st) 132250, 24 N.E.3d 168. McBride, J. with Gordon and Reyes, J.J., concurring. 


    PLA Allowed: 03/25/15

    ARBITRATION

    No. 118422 

    State of Illinois v. American Federation of State County & Municipal Employees, Council 31

    The issue in this case is whether section 21 of the Public Relations Act (5 ILCS 315/21 (West 2012)) (the “Act”) requires the State to spend more than $52 million in public funds pursuant to an arbitration award without a legislative appropriation.

    In 2008, the Illinois Department of Central Management Services (“CMS”), on behalf of several state agencies, and the American Federal of State County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“AFSCME”), on behalf of employees at the state agencies, entered into a collective bargaining agreement that provided, among other things, for scheduled wage increases in each year of the agreement. After the State budget for fiscal 2012 did not include appropriations sufficient to cover the wage and salary amounts provided in the agreement, CMS suspended scheduled wage increases for that year. An arbitrator ruled that the State was obligated to pay the increases and the circuit court affirmed in part, but postponed full enforcement until the legislature appropriated additional funds. Both parties appealed. The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, held that the Act required immediate payment regardless of whether the funds were appropriated.

    The State argues that the Appellate Court disregarded the Appropriations Clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, § 2(b)) by holding that a statutory contracting authority is not limited to the amount of actual legislative appropriations. It argues that this holding is in conflict with Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Burris, 118 Ill. 2d 465 (1987); People ex rel. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. Barrett, 382 Ill. 321 (1943); Cook County v. Ogilvie, 50 Ill. 2d 379 (1972); and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Netsch, 216 Ill. App. 3d 566 (4th Dist. 1991) (per curiam).

    Appellate Court Opinion: 2014 IL App (1st) 130262, 19 N.E.3d 1127. Neville, J., with Simon, P.J., and Pierce, J., concurring.

    PLA Allowed: 03/25/15 

    Appellant Counsel: Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of State of Illinois, Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, Richard S. Huszagh, Assistant Attorney General, 100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor, Chicago, Illinois 60601, (312) 814-2587.


  • September 15, 2015 10:22 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    "Unexpected Justice: The Rise of John Paul Stevens," is a documentary about the historic 1969 investigation of a bribery scandal in the Illinois Supreme Court. The investigation, led by then-attorney John Paul Stevens, was a remarkable chapter in the history of the Chicago bar and was a catalyst for Stevens' judicial career.  


    The film will be broadcast on WTTW, the PBS station in Chicago, on Friday, September 18th at 7:30 p.m. and on Sunday, September 20th at 5:30 pm.  


    The ALA thanks Butler Rubin Saltarelli & Boyd LLP, which generously funded the "Illinois Justice" Documentary Film Project


    To view a short clip of the film, click here.


  • September 12, 2015 8:20 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    On October 1, 2015, the Association will host a luncheon at the Union League Club in Chicago featuring Professor David Strauss of the University of Chicago Law School. Professor Strauss, who has argued 18 cases before the United States Supreme Court and is co-editor of the Supreme Court Review, will share his insight on the High Court's upcoming term, which begins in October. 


    The ALA welcomes all to join Professor Strauss for an informative and engaging luncheon. For more information and to register, please click here


  • September 05, 2015 8:07 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    Under the “collateral order” doctrine, a non-final district court order may be appealable despite the “final order” requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, if certain criteria are met. In general, the order must be conclusive; it must resolve an important issue apart from the merits; and it must be effectively unreviewable on an appeal in the underlying action. 



    In United States of America v. Sinovel Wind Group Co., Ltd.,  2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12694 (7th Cir. July 23, 2015), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected application of the collateral order doctrine and found that an appeal by a partially owned Chinese corporation lacked jurisdiction. The court also rejected use of a mandamus to obtain appellate review.


    In June of 2013, the United States Department of Justice attempted to serve Sinovel Wind Group Company (“Sinovel”), a Chinese corporation with 18% government ownership, with a criminal summons, by serving its wholly owned U.S. subsidiary, Sinovel USA, in Texas. The summons revealed that Sinovel had been indicted in the Western District of Wisconsin for criminal copyright infringement and trade secret theft involving computer software. 

    Sinovel specially appeared in district court to file a motion to quash service of the summons, complaint and indictment for lack of personal jurisdiction under applicable federal criminal rules. It contended that service on Sinovel USA was not the equivalent to service on Sinovel itself.  Id. at *4. The district court found that Sinovel USA was the alter ego of Sinovel and denied the motion. Id. Sinovel filed a notice of appeal in September of 2014. It also filed a petition for writ of mandamus directly with the Seventh Circuit. 

    In an opinion authored by Chief Judge Diane P. Wood, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal and denied the writ of mandamus. She first addressed appealability, noting that the order appealed from was not “final” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. After outlining the parameters of the collateral order doctrine, she turned to Sinovel’s arguments for why the district court order should be treated as a collateral order.

    Sinovel basically argued the importance of the district court ruling based upon the Chinese government’s partial ownership. It further contended that the order was practically unreviewable, at least until conclusion of the criminal proceeding, and that prosecution of the case could imperil foreign relations.


    Chief Judge Wood pointed out, however, that litigants routinely raise personal-jurisdiction objections that are not reviewable until after the merits of the litigation have been resolved. She further noted that special rights for foreign-government-owned corporations are not triggered under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act unless the foreign government owns a majority interest.In addition, she observed that the fact that the Executive Branch, through the U.S. Department of Justice, had made the decision to prosecute the case constituted adequate consideration of the impact on foreign relations.

    Ultimately, Chief Judge Wood found that the district court’s jurisdiction decision was not unreviewable after final judgment, and that the appeal therefore lacked jurisdiction. 

    Some of these considerations overlapped with Wood’s evaluation of the petition for the writ of mandamus. She noted, for example, that such writs do not issue unless the petitioner has no other adequate remedy and has demonstrated a “clear and indisputable” right to the relief sought. Wood ultimately found that no compelling reason for immediate action existed here and that Sinovel would have an adequate remedy in an appeal after final judgment.

    Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus.


    Recommended Citation: Don R. Sampen, Mere Involvement of a Foreign Government Does Not Fulfill the “Collateral Order” Criteria for an Interlocutory Appeal, The Brief (September 5, 2015), http://applawyers-thebrief.blogspot.com/2015/09/mere-involvement-of-foreign-government.html#more.


  • August 30, 2015 10:03 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    On September 25, 2015, the Seventh Circuit Bar Association will sponsor a program offering insight on how to successfully practice before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The all-day seminar will feature judges from the Seventh Circuit - including Chief Judge Diane P. Wood and Judges William J. Bauer, Richard A. Posner, Frank H. Easterbrook, and Michael S. Kanne - as well as appellate practitioners who regularly appear before the court. The program will offer presentations and panel discussions on a variety of topics related to appellate practice and procedure, including electronic case filing, motions practice at the Seventh Circuit, and the importance of standards of review, among others.


    Of note, ALA President Michael A. Scodro, former Illinois Solicitor General and currently of Jenner & Block, will speak on legal writing. Current Illinois Solicitor General Carolyn Shapiro will interview Judge Posner; and ALA member Mary Welsh, also of the Illinois Attorney General's office, will speak on the responsibilities of counsel when an adversary appears pro se.

    The ALA encourages its members to attend the seminar, which will take place at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago. For more information and to register, please click here.


  • August 04, 2015 9:49 PM | Anonymous member (Administrator)
    The Second District considered whether a failure to provide the requisite disclosures under section 22.1 of the Condominium Property Act gives rise to a right of action where the failure to disclose is discovered post-closing. D’Attomo v. Baumbeck, 2015 IL App (2d)140865. The court held that such a right of action does exist for post-closing conduct because to find otherwise would nullify the intended purpose of section 22.1 of the Act.


    The plaintiffs in D’Attomo purchased a condominium unit from the defendant in June 2013 which they intended to lease until they retired and sold their existing residence. D’Attomo, 2015 IL App. (2d) 140865, ¶ 4. The plaintiffs made a “22.1 Disclosure” request seeking copies of the condominium declarations, by-laws, budget, financial statements and board meeting minutes. Id. The defendant seller (Baumbeck) provided the plaintiffs with a copy of the 2002 Declarations, which expressly permitted the unit owners to lease their respective units. Id. ¶ 5. The defendant, a member of the association board, did not provide the plaintiffs with notice of a 2010 amendment to the 2002 Declarations that included a Rental Limitations that precluded owners from leasing their individual units. Id.¶ 7. The defendant voted against this amendment in his capacity as a board member and so was aware of the change in the rules. Id.The plaintiffs discovered the 2010 amendment after the sale closed. Id. They were forced to terminate a prospective lease and sell the unit. Id. They then filed suit against the defendant in his capacity as the seller, as a member of the board. The plaintiffs also sued the board and the association. Id. ¶ 8.

    The counts against the defendant seller alleged a violation of section 22.1 of the Act, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. The latter two counts were directed against the defendant in his capacity as a board member. The plaintiffs alleged breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud against the board and the association.  Id. ¶¶ 8-14. 

    The board and association filed a section 2-615 motion to dismiss the counts against them arguing that they owed no fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs because they were not owners until after the closing and no fiduciary duty could have existed until that time. D’Attomo, 2015 IL App (2d) 140865, ¶ 15. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the counts against the board and the association without prejudice and with leave to re-plead on February 27, 2014. Id. ¶ 16.

    The defendant seller filed a separate motion to dismiss the counts against him under section 2-619(a)(9). D’Attomo, 2015 IL App (2d) 140865, ¶ 17. The defendant argued there was no cause of action under section 22.1 of the Act for post-closing conduct and that plaintiffs otherwise failed to timely request the documents to be able to trigger application of the Act. He further argued that there was no breach of contract claim absent a timely request for a 22.1 disclosure and there is otherwise no cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing. He next contended that the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation claims failed as both theories were premised on implied obligations. He also claimed that the fiduciary duty and constructive fraud claims based on his status as a board member failed because no fiduciary duty was owed to the plaintiffs until after the closing, the alleged failure to disclose occurred pre-closing and he was no longer a member of the board at that time. Id. ¶ 18.

    The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint against him in its entirety with prejudice on April 24, 2014. The order stated that it was final and appealable. A motion to reconsider was denied on August 5, 2015. This order stated that the April 24, 2014 order statement regarding finality was intended to be a Rule 304(a) finding. Id. ¶ 19. The plaintiffs then appealed from both the February 27 and April 24 orders. 

    The appellate court first determined that it had no jurisdiction to review the February 27, 2014 order dismissing the complaint as to the board and the association. D’Attomo, 2015 IL App (2d) 140865, ¶¶ 22-28. The court observed that the February 27 dismissal was without prejudice which indicated it was not final. Id. ¶ 24. This much was confirmed by the trial court’s statements to the plaintiffs allowing them leave to re-plead. Id. ¶ 26. Finally, the fact that Rule 304(a) language attached to the April 24 order did not affect the non-appealability and non-finality of the February 27 order because there was no reference to the dismissal of the board or association, parties who were dismissed via a separate motion. Id. ¶ 27. The record also showed that the Rule 304(a) language was invoked because the defendant filed a fee petition. Id. The court then turned to the merits of the plaintiff’s appeal from the order dismissing the counts against defendant seller. Id. ¶ 30.

    The court first examined section 22.1 of the Act and noted that its purpose was to fully inform condominium purchasers from buying a unit without being fully informed of the rules, regulations and financial stability of the management. D’Attomo, 2015 IL App (2d) 140865, ¶ 34. Adopting the reasoning set out in Nikolopulos v. Valaudos, 245 Ill. App. 3d 71 (1993), the court concluded that a right of action exists where the requested documents were concealed and the concealment is not revealed until after the closing. D’Attomo, 2015 IL App (2d) 140865, ¶¶ 35-38. The court acknowledged that Nikolopulos considered pre-closing conduct but found that the reasoning in that case applied equally to post-closing conduct. To conclude otherwise would render section 22.1 ineffective. Id. ¶¶ 38-39. In so concluding, the appellate court rejected the defendant’s argument that the Act’s reference only to pre-closing remedies precluded a recognition of a post-closing remedy. Id. ¶¶ 43-44. The court also rejected the defendant’s timeliness argument, finding he waived that objection by formally responding to the plaintiff’s 22.1 disclosure request. Id. ¶ 45.

    As for the breach of contract claim, the court found that, because the obligations to provide full disclosure under section 22.1 of the Act were incorporated into the contract to sell the condominium unit as a matter of law, the defendant’s failure to disclose the 2010 amendment and Rental Limitation could support a breach of contract claim. Id. ¶¶ 49-52. The court, however, agreed with the defendant that there was no independent cause of action for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. ¶ 53.

    The court next affirmed dismissal of the fraudulent concealment counts citing the absence of a fiduciary relationship between the defendant and the plaintiffs. D’Attomo, 2015 IL App (2d) 140865, ¶¶ 57-60. The court reasoned that, because the first element of a fraudulent concealment claim requires proof of concealment when there is a duty to speak, a fiduciary or confidential relationship must exist for that duty to speak to arise. Id. ¶ 59. The court observed that, although the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had a duty to disclose under section 22.1 of the Act, there were no allegations that the defendant was the plaintiff’s fiduciary or in a position of superior influence over them. Id. ¶ 60. To the contrary, the plaintiffs could have discovered the 2010 amendment through their own reasonable inquiry, which was another basis to support a dismissal of this count. Id. The fact that the plaintiffs did not allege that they could not have discovered the 2010 amendment through their own reasonable inquiry also defeated the fraudulent misrepresentation count. Id. ¶ 61. 

    Finally, the court affirmed dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud counts against the defendant in his capacity as a board member because no fiduciary relationship with the plaintiffs could have existed until after the closing at which time the defendant was no longer a member of the board. D’Attomo, 2015 IL App (2d) 140865, ¶¶ 67-74. While the plaintiffs alleged both pre and post-sale misconduct, the failure to disclose happened pre-sale before a fiduciary duty could have arisen. Id. ¶ 67. Similarly, since constructive fraud “springs” from a breach of fiduciary duty, that claim was also properly dismissed because no such duty existed when the concealment occurred. Id. ¶ 73-74. 

    The court reversed the dismissal of the section 22.1 claim and the breach of contract count, affirmed dismissal of the remainder of the complaint as to the defendant seller and remanded for further proceedings. D’Attomo, 2015 IL App (2d) 140865 ¶ 76. The appeal from the order dismissing the board and the association was dismissed.

    Recommended Citation: Rosa M. Tumialán, Condominium Property Act Allows a Right of Action for Post-closing Conduct, The Brief, (August 4, 2015), http://applawyers-thebrief.blogspot.com/2015/08/condominium-property-act-allows-right.html#more.


  • July 23, 2015 5:58 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)
    In Bell v. Taylor, No. 14-3099 (7th Cir. June 29, 2015), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit admonished litigants that, rather than embarking on a lengthy appellate process and risking dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, they should bring inadvertent errors in district courts’ final judgment orders first to the attention of a district court judge, so that the errors may be promptly corrected. In Bell, the Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction an appeal in a copyright infringement case, where the district court’s purported final judgment order failed to address the copyright owner’s outstanding request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 7-8.



    In Bell, a copyright owner brought an action against three Indiana businesses for the unauthorized use of his photograph, featuring a daytime Indianapolis skyline, on their websites. Id. at 2-3. While recognizing the plaintiff’s legitimate ownership of copyright in the image, the district court nonetheless dismissed, on summary judgment, all claims against the defendants and entered final judgment against the plaintiff. See Bell v. Taylor, No. 13-cv-798, 2014 WL 4250110 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2014). The court ruled that, with respect to a computer repair company’s website, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) because he attached the wrong photograph to his complaint, that is, the website used an image of a nighttime Indianapolis skyline, not the daytime skyline. Id. at *3. With respect to an insurance agent’s website, the court ruled that the plaintiff could not establish damages because the website generated no traffic and was swiftly shut down. Id. at *4. Even though the real estate agent’s website displayed the copyrighted image, without permission, between 2009 and 2011, the court ruled that the plaintiff could not establish a causal link between the agent’s gross revenues and the unauthorized use of the image, and thus could not show damages. Id. at *5. The district court then entered a purported “final judgment” order, which Bell appealed to the Seventh Circuit under 28 U.S.C. §1291 governing appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.

    In a unanimous decision, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and remanded to the district court. Bell v. Taylor, No. 14-3099 (7th Cir. June 29, 2015). The Seventh Circuit ruled that the district court’s ruling on summary judgment was not final because it did not resolve Bell’s claim for injunctive relief. Id. at 5. The Court pointed out that, because defendants sought summary judgment only on the issue of damages, the district court did not have a chance to decide whether Bell’s claim warranted injunctive relief. Id. Accordingly, Bell’s copyright claim “was still alive” and there was no final judgment for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §1291. Id. at 6.

    Defendants argued that the issue of injunctive relief was moot because they had already removed Bell’s photos from their websites. Id.at 8 fn. 1. The Seventh Circuit, however, declined to address the mootness issue in the absence of a final judgment from the district court. Id.

    The Seventh Circuit pointed out that the case did not have to go through a lengthy appeal process, which lasted almost nine months, to correct the district court’s error. Id. at 7. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(a) and 60(b) were available to the plaintiff to bring the error to the district court’s attention, as they authorize district courts to correct orders entered by “oversights,” “mistake,” and “inadvertence.” But Bell neglected to bring the error to the district court’s attention, instead opting to address it before the Seventh Circuit. Id.

    Alternatively (and even though not mentioned by the Seventh Circuit), Rule 54(b) was available to the plaintiff to pursue an appeal from a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties, upon the district court’s express finding that there was no just reason to delay the appeal. Instead of utilizing various procedural vehicles to either correct the error below or to pursue an appeal from a part of the final judgment order, the plaintiff chose to press with an appeal from a defective order, which resulted in a waste of the parties’ and judicial resources. 

    Recommended Citation: Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Court Warns Litigants to Address Errors in District Court Final Orders Below, The Brief (July **, 2015), http://applawyers-thebrief.blogspot.com.


  • July 18, 2015 8:45 AM | Anonymous member (Administrator)

    On August 1, 2015, Scribes, The American Society of Legal Writers, will host its annual awards luncheon in Chicago during the American Bar Association's annual meeting. The luncheon will be held at the Swissôtel, and Brian A. Garner, editor-in-chief of Black'sLaw Dictionary and author of several books on legal writing, will give thekeynote address. Garner will also present the Scribes Lifetime Achievement Award to Lord Woolf, who was the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales from 2000 until 2005. Among his many contributions to the art of legal writing, Lord Woolf authored the Woolf Reforms, which has simplified the legal vocabulary in the United Kingdom.


    Also during the luncheon, Justice Michael B. Hyman of the Appellate Court, First District, will be installed as president of the Scribes organization.


    For more information and to register, please click here


DISCLAIMER: The Appellate Lawyers Association does not provide legal services or legal advice. Discussions of legal principles and authority, including, but not limited to, constitutional provisions, statutes, legislative enactments, court rules, case law, and common-law doctrines are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice.

Powered by Wild Apricot Membership Software