By:  Linda Sackey

In Lewis v. Village of Alsip, 23 F. 4th 772 (7th Cir. 2022), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reminded the public that “[p]eople must learn about their legal obligations.” Their failure to do so is no defense.

The Village of Alsip has enacted an ordinance that prohibits parking on any primary snow route at any time within 12 hours after a snowfall of one inch or more. Primary snow routes are streets marked with signs designating them as primary snow routes. The ordinance also bans parking on any secondary snow routes at any time within 24 hours after a snowfall of three inches or more. Secondary snow routes are all streets in the village that are not designated primary snow routes.

During a snowstorm, Shellie Lewis left her car parked on a public street in the village that, as it turned out, was a secondary snow route. She was fined $50 for violating the ordinance. Most people do not enjoy receiving a parking ticket; however, Lewis apparently was so displeased that she filed a lawsuit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. §1983. She claimed that the village violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to mount signs on every street to warn drivers when snow requires them to remove their vehicles.

The district court dismissed Lewis’s complaint, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed its decision. Citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 532 (1982), the court of appeals explained that “[g]enerally, a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply.”

The Seventh Circuit rejected Lewis’s claim that traffic regulations were a special constitutional matter. The court found numerous decisions holding that traffic laws were not exceptional. For instance, in Cochran v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 828 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2016), the Seventh Circuit ruled that “[d]ue process does not require a state to post signage notifying all those entering of its laws and regulations. Rather, the statute or regulation is adequate notice in and of itself as long as it is clear.”

In short, this opinion rests on the well-known principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse.

Hon. Alan Joel Greiman, former circuit court judge and Chief Justice of the Illinois Appellate Court, has passed away at the age of 90.  As a judge, he instituted a celebrated mediation program and other innovations that resulted in speedier resolutions of cases.

Justice Greiman also served in the Illinois House of Representatives, where he served as Assistant Majority Leader.  During his tenure in the House, he sponsored the Illinois Domestic Violence Act, as well as legislation granting no-fault divorce and the right to public employee collective bargaining, prohibiting the sale of handguns, banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, protecting newsrooms from unreasonable searches, and was the first in the nation to propose a ban on discrimination based on age. He also was an ardent sponsor of the Equal Rights Amendment.

On behalf of the Appellate Lawyers Association, ALA President Scott Howie issued the following statement: 

"Justice Greiman was an exemplary member of the appellate court, an exacting questioner at oral argument and fair and thorough in his written opinions. He was also a great friend and supporter of the Appellate Lawyers Association, and we’ll miss him very much. On behalf of the ALA, I extend our deepest condolences to his family and many friends and colleagues."

Services will be held at 10 a.m. on Thursday, February 17, 2022, Chicago Jewish Funerals, 8851 Skokie Blvd. (at Niles Center Road) Skokie, IL.  Justice Greiman's obituary, which includes details regarding memorial contributions and a livestream of the services, may be found here.

The law firm of Cassiday Schade LLP is accepting applications for an associate position in its Appellate Department.  The Department handles all appellate work for the firm’s offices in the Illinois Appellate Court, the Illinois Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.

The associate would work closely with the head of the Appellate Department in drafting appellate briefs and arguing in the reviewing courts.  The associate would also work closely with trial counsel on post-trial motions and appeals.  The individual should have strong research, writing, and oral advocacy skills.  Resumes may be submitted to the head of Cassiday Schade’s Appellate Department, Julie Teuscher, at jteuscher@cassiday.com. 

The Law Department of the City of Chicago is accepting applications for an Assistant Corporation Counsel position in its Appeals Division.  The Division handles all appellate work for the City of Chicago in the Illinois Appellate Court, the Illinois Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Division is comprised of a Deputy Corporation Counsel, a Chief Assistant Corporation Counsel, a Senior Counsel, and approximately eight Assistant Corporation Counsel.  Typically, each case is assigned to a single Assistant Corporation Counsel (or Senior Counsel).  The Deputy and the Chief work on every case.  The Appeals Division works cooperatively with the lower court attorneys and supervisors in drafting the appellate brief and preparing for oral argument. The Appeals Division files upwards of a hundred briefs every year on a variety of topics.

More details on how to apply for the position may be found here.

By:  Kimberly Glasford

Recently, in Armstead v. National Freight, Inc., 2021 IL 126730, the Illinois Supreme Court reiterated that the distinction between claims and issues is crucial under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).

Following a vehicular collision in Illinois, the plaintiff brought a workers’ compensation claim against his Pennsylvania-based employer in Pennsylvania. The order adjudicating the plaintiff’s claim incorporated an agreement stating that he had sustained only right knee strain, to the exclusion of other injuries.

The plaintiff then filed a two-count negligence claim against the other driver and his employer in Illinois. The circuit court granted defendants’ “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or Summary Determination of a Major Issue” and determined that the plaintiff’s judicial admission in the workers’ compensation agreement prohibited him from raising any injury other than right knee strain. The court also found there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal under Rule 304(a).

The plaintiff appealed.  The circuit court, however, subsequently granted his motion to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice the rest of his action as to injuries pertaining to right knee strain. The plaintiff then filed a second notice of appeal. After consolidating the appeals, the appellate court affirmed on different grounds.

Justice Overstreet, writing for the majority, found that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the circuit court’s partial summary judgment ruling.

Rule 304(a) states, in pertinent part, that “[i]f multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.” (Emphases added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Conversely, Rule 304(a) does not authorize the review of orders disposing of mere issues within a claim. Armstead, 2021 IL, 126730, ¶ 24.

The supreme court found that the circuit court’s order granting the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment disposed of an issue that was ancillary to, rather than separate from, his negligence claims. Id. ¶ 27. Specifically, the order resolved the issue of whether the workers’ compensation agreement contained a judicial admission precluding him from asserting injuries to his shoulder and back. Yet, the order did not resolve either negligence claim. Consequently, the circuit court’s Rule 304(a) language had no effect and jurisdiction remained in that court.

Moreover, because the plaintiff failed to refile the action within one year (735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 2016)), his action remained dismissed. Accordingly, the supreme court vacated the appellate court’s decision in its entirety and remanded for the circuit court to dismiss the case.

Chief Justice Anne M. Burke, joined by Justice Neville, concurred in part and dissented in part. She agreed that the plaintiff’s appeal under Rule 304(a) was improper because it merely resolved an issue. The same reasoning, however, precluded the court from addressing the order on the plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal.

Specifically, Chief Justice Burke observed that while the majority concluded that the plaintiff dismissed “his action,” he had actually attempted to dismiss his “claim” for right knee strain, a claim which did not exist. Even assuming the plaintiff had dismissed the entire action, the appeal was moot because the plaintiff did not attempt to refile. The appropriate remedy would be to vacate the circuit court’s voluntary dismissal order and return the case to the circuit court with the partial summary judgment ruling intact.

The distinction between issues and claims appears to plague both litigants and courts alike. Tread carefully.

By:  Linda Sackey

In part, the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, authorizes a reduction of a sentence for a prisoner who is serving a sentence for a covered crack-cocaine offense. Under the First Step Act, the prisoner is entitled to ask a judge to treat him as if the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 had been in force on the date of his original sentence.

At issue in United States v. Hible, 13 F.4th 647 (7th Cir. 2021), was whether a motion to reconsider a decision under the First Step Act extends the time to file an appeal. Each prisoner in the consolidated cases before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sought a shorter sentence and filed, within the time allowed for appeal, a motion asking the district court to reconsider an adverse decision. The judges in each case denied that motion, and the prisoner appealed. Each prisoner filed a notice of appeal within 14 days of the decision on the motion to reconsider but more than 14 days after the original decision.

Observing that the Supreme Court has held repeatedly that motions to reconsider in criminal cases extend the time for appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a motion to reconsider a decision under the First Step Act suspends the decision’s finality and extends the time to appeal. The court’s ruling was of no help to either prisoner in these cases, as their requests for lower sentences remained denied, but it settles the law in this area going forward.

Today, the Illinois Supreme Court announced that, effective January 1, 2022, it is lifting the pause on judicial redistricting in Public Act 102-11.  This law will change the judicial district boundaries, including the districts of the appellate court, for the first time since they were established in 1964.  The Court had paused the transition to give the courts sufficient time to plan and implement the significant changes it required.

Effective January 1, 2022, a notice of appeal initiating an appeal to the appellate court or a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 302(b) shall be transmitted by the clerk of the circuit court to the appropriate appellate district as established by the Public Act 102-11.  Additionally, a petition or application or motion under Rule 303(d), Rule 303A, Rule 306, Rule 307(d), Rule 308, Rule 335, Rule 604(c), or Rule 606(c) will be filed in the new appellate district established by the Act. These provisions will apply regardless of the date of the judgment appealed or sought to be
appealed.

Circuit courts will remain subject to the rule that, when a conflict arises among the districts, a circuit court is bound by the decisions of the appellate court of the district in which it sits.  In a redistricted circuit, the appropriate appellate district will be the district in which the circuit was located at the time that the circuit court action was initiated.

If a case is heard by one appellate court district on appeal and if a subsequent appeal in that case is heard by a new appellate district pursuant to the order, the new district will treat the decision of the prior district as the law of the case.  That the decision of the prior district applied the law of the prior
district that is contrary to the law of the new district will not be a basis for departing from the decision of the prior district.

The full text of the Court's order may be found here, and the full text of Public Act 102-11, which lists the counties included in each new appellate district, may be found here.

The Illinois Supreme Court has appointed retired Judge John L. Hauptman to replace Justice Vicki R. Wright, who retired from the Illinois Appellate Court, Third District, effective November 30, 2021.  Justice Hauptman's appointment is effective from December 1, 2021 through December 4, 2022.

Justice Wright began her legal career as an appellate prosecutor in the Third District in 1982, after graduating from Loyola University School of Law in Chicago.  She became an Assistant State’s Attorney in Whiteside County in 1984 and was appointed as a Circuit Judge for the 14th Judicial Circuit in 1991.  She was the first female Associate Circuit Judge appointed to the 14th Judicial Circuit and, in 2006, became the first person from Whiteside County elected to the Third District of the Appellate Court.

Before joining the bench, Justice Hauptman earned his Juris Doctor from the John Marshall Law School, worked in private practice for over 10 years, and served as an Assistant State’s Attorney in Whiteside County.  Justice Hauptman was first appointed to the bench in 1997 as an Associate Circuit Judge in the 14th Judicial Circuit.  He was elected as Circuit Judge in Whiteside County in 2004 and was retained for another term in 2010.  During his tenure as Circuit Judge, Judge Hauptman helped organize the first Drug Court in Whiteside County.  He retired in December 2016.  

The Appellate Lawyers Association thanks Justices Wright and Hauptman for their many years of service on the bench and congratulates them on their respective retirement and appointment. 

By:  Carson Griffis*

In Miller v. Thom, 2021 IL App (4th) 200410, the appellate court addressed whether forum non conveniens applied to a plaintiff's error in e-filing her complaint in the wrong county.

The plaintiff e-filed her medical malpractice complaint in the circuit court of Sangamon County, but the complaint's caption indicated that it was being brought in St. Clair County.  The defendants filed their appearances in Sangamon County and a motion to dismiss the complaint for failing to attach the necessary affidavit under section 2-622 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  735 ILCS 5/2-622.  In response, the plaintiff filed the requisite affidavit in Sangamon County.

The plaintiff then filed a motion to transfer venue, stating that her attorney inadvertently selected Sangamon County rather than St. Clair County in the Odyssey e-filing system.  The circuit court denied the motion but gave the plaintiff an opportunity to file a forum non conveniens motion instead.   The plaintiff then filed a forum non conveniens motion, which the circuit court granted.

On appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2), which allows for interlocutory appeals from orders granting or denying forum non conveniens motions, the appellate court reversed the circuit court's transfer order.  Leaving aside the question of whether a plaintiff could bring a forum non conveniens motion at all, the court held that the plaintiff's motion did not implicate that doctrine because forum non conveniens applies when there is more than one proper venue for an action, but one venue is more convenient than the other.  In this case, Sangamon County was not a proper venue because it had no connection to the lawsuit -- the only reason that Sangamon County was involved was plaintiff's e-filing mistake.  So this was not a circumstance where both Sangamon and St. Clair Counties were appropriate venues, but St. Clair County was more convenient. 

The court also held that the venue provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure did not justify the transfer of plaintiff's action.  The court noted that a defendant must file a motion to transfer venue "on or before the date upon which he or she is required to appear or within any further time that may be granted him or her to answer or move with respect to the complaint."  735 ILCS 5/2-104(b).  Because that time had elapsed by the time the plaintiff moved to transfer venue, the court held that it would be "unjust" to allow the plaintiff to seek to transfer venue, especially since the venue statute is "designed to protect defendants."

*Carson Griffis is an Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Appeals Division of the Office of the Illinois Attorney General.  No comments made in this post are made on behalf of the Office of the Illinois Attorney General, nor do they reflect the views or opinions of the Office of the Illinois Attorney General.

As previously detailed, the Seventh Circuit had invited comments on its proposal to rescind Circuit Rule 57 because it conflicted with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1.  Having received no comments, the Seventh Circuit repealed that rule effective immediately.  

Circuit Rule 57 provided that a party who filed a motion to modify a final judgment in the district court while an appeal was pending had to request the district court to indicate whether it was inclined to grant the motion.  If the district court indicated that it was, then the Seventh Circuit would "remand the case for the purpose of modifying the judgment" and a party "dissatisfied with the judgment as modified [had to] file a fresh notice of appeal."  Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1 provides that, if the district court states that it would grant such a motion or that the motion raises a substantial issue, "the court of appeals may remand for further proceedings but retains jurisdiction unless it expressly dismisses the appeal."

The court's press release regarding the rescission of Circuit Rule 57 may be found here.